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Enhancing digital certificate security

3 Ιανουαρίου 2013
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18 σχόλια :

Unknown είπε...

MSFT is pushing update

Microsoft Security Advisory 2798897

Fraudulent Digital Certificates Could Allow Spoofing

http://technet.microsoft.com/security/advisory/2798897

3 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 1:34 μ.μ.
dwoz είπε...

Its a good example of how the best security pracitces we have still go terribly wrong at times.

Daniel Wozniak

3 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 2:12 μ.μ.
S J είπε...

Why does plus.google.com use a *.google.com cert? Seems like extremely poor decision by the plus team and Google Online Security to allow use of a domain wild card cert. In fact, why does a *.google.com cert exist? If you think, nothing wrong with the practice then is plus the only product/service to use a wild card cert?

3 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 2:37 μ.μ.
Unknown είπε...

That's why we should finally switch to TLSA RRs, which only make sense with DNSSEC.

If you, fellow readers, administrate a DNS service at your company, get DNSSEC set up. TLSA or CAA afterwards is trivial. Chrome already verifies it, Mozilla has plans to do so (also a nice introduction): https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/DNSSEC-TLS-details#Embedding_Certificate_Information_in_DNS

3 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 2:39 μ.μ.
Ανώνυμος είπε...

@Sebastian, yes, let's put registrars and NICs in charge instead... no, thanks!

3 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 2:57 μ.μ.
Collin είπε...

The conclusion of the post notes that Google "may also decide to take additional action after further discussion and careful consideration," which to me hints that the Chrome team, as others, are likely considering whether to continue including TURKTRUST root. While I fully appreciate the ramifications of the breach, I would inveigh upon the community to take time to consider subsequent actions. Unfortunately, due to banking embargoes against sanctioned states, there are very few CAs that accept customers from Iran and Syria. TRUSTTRUST and ipsCA (not trusted) are likely the primary CAs for these audiences. Unfortunately if this CA is removed, it is likely that the decision will push many sites into the national, not-trusted and completely compromised CA ParsSign.

3 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 5:33 μ.μ.
Schmaltz Herring είπε...

Diginotar CA is gone after what happened. I hope the same will happen to TURKTRUST.

3 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 9:00 μ.μ.
Unknown είπε...

As a Turkish citizen, I agree that Turktrust should be condemned. However, previously and duly issued certificates should not be revoked, it is not fair for the merchants who may not (and in all likelihood do not) understand what is going on. That said, I'd like to reiterate that I agree with Google's decision.

4 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 3:56 π.μ.
Nephilim είπε...

@Google: Can you tell us, *how* did you find this out?

4 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 7:12 π.μ.
Tritonio είπε...

Google should ASAP improve the extensions' API to allow extensions like SSL observatory and Convergence to be created for Chrome. Firefox had the proper API for years and I am really thinking of switching back to Firefox because of Chrome's crippled API.

In other words if you actually care about user privacy, give the users tools to make stuff to protect their privacy as *they* see fit.

4 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 9:41 π.μ.
Paul B είπε...

Locksmith: Google probably do NOT use a *.google.com certificate.

The issue here is that SOMEONE ELSE managed to create one (and one that was TRUSTED) and use it for a man-in-the-middle attack against Google.

4 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 11:33 π.μ.
Neil Rashbrook είπε...

@Nephilim My understanding is that Chrome knows who the issuers of the real Google certificates are, so that it can immediately identify a fraudulent certificate.

6 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 7:03 π.μ.
Unknown είπε...

@Paul B:

Google uses *.google.com certs a lot. With quite a lot of Subject Alternative Names.

An example of *.google.com certs for various hosts collected just by browsing (note that some repeat, they are shared for multiple google services).

Another count from an observatory (those are all unique certs, most of which, if not all, belonging really to google):

select count(id) from ee_certs where subject like '%CN=*.google.com%' and not_after >= '2013-01-01';
count
-------
1188

(Sorry if this is double-posted, the comment system does not make it easy).

7 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 10:55 π.μ.
newsham είπε...

Please scope the CAs already. I don't need turktrust or any of its intermediaries signing for anything but *.tr!

8 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 5:04 μ.μ.
Ανώνυμος είπε...

so still intermediate CA are issuing such kind of digital certification. If this is happening then how actual digital certificate can be redeem with the parent CA.

10 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 12:44 μ.μ.
mdav (IRC) είπε...

It seems the time is right for DANE (RFC6698), so I hope it will be incorporated in Chrome and other browsers some day soon.

31 Ιανουαρίου 2013 στις 10:33 π.μ.
Ανώνυμος είπε...

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13 Ιουνίου 2014 στις 2:00 π.μ.
Ανώνυμος είπε...

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20 Ιουνίου 2014 στις 1:07 π.μ.

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