Google Online Security Blog

Rust/C++ interop in the Android Platform

June 8, 2021

Posted by Joel Galenson and Matthew Maurer, Android TeamOne of the main challenges of evaluating Rust for use within the Android platform was ensuring we could provide sufficient interoperability with our existing codebase. If Rust is to meet its goals of improving security, stability, and quality Android-wide, we need to be able to use Rust anywhere in the codebase that native code is required. To accomplish this, we need to provide the majority of functionality platform developers use. As we discussed previously, we have too much C++ to consider ignoring it, rewriting all of it is infeasible, and rewriting older code would likely be counterproductive as the bugs in that code have largely been fixed. This means interoperability is the most practical way forward. Before introducing Rust into the Android Open Source Project (AOSP), we needed to demonstrate that Rust interoperability with C and C++ is sufficient for practical, convenient, and safe use within Android. Adding a new language has costs; we needed to demonstrate that Rust would be able to scale across the codebase and meet its potential in order to justify those costs. This post will cover the analysis we did more than a year ago while we evaluated Rust for use in Android. We also present a follow-up analysis with some insights into how the original analysis has held up as Android projects have adopted Rust. Language interoperability in Android Existing language interoperability in Android focuses on well defined foreign-function interface (FFI) boundaries, which is where code written in one programming language calls into code written in a different language. Rust support will likewise focus on the FFI boundary as this is consistent with how AOSP projects are developed, how code is shared, and how dependencies are managed. For Rust interoperability with C, the C application binary interface (ABI) is already sufficient. Interoperability with C++ is more challenging and is the focus of this post. While both Rust and C++ support using the C ABI, it is not sufficient for idiomatic usage of either language. Simply enumerating the features of each language results in an unsurprising conclusion: many concepts are not easily translatable, nor do we necessarily want them to be. After all, we’re introducing Rust because many features and characteristics of C++ make it difficult to write safe and correct code. Therefore, our goal is not to consider all language features, but rather to analyze how Android uses C++ and ensure that interop is convenient for the vast majority of our use cases. We analyzed code and interfaces in the Android platform specifically, not codebases in general. While this means our specific conclusions may not be accurate for other codebases, we hope the methodology can help others to make a more informed decision about introducing Rust into their large codebase. Our colleagues on the Chrome browser team have done a similar analysis, which you can find here. This analysis was not originally intended to be published outside of Google: our goal was to make a data-driven decision on whether or not Rust was a good choice for systems development in Android. While the analysis is intended to be accurate and actionable, it was never intended to be comprehensive, and we’ve pointed out a couple of areas where it could be more complete. However, we also note that initial investigations into these areas showed that they would not significantly impact the results, which is why we decided to not invest the additional effort. Methodology Exported functions from Rust and C++ libraries are where we consider interop to be essential. Our goals are simple:

Rust must be able to call functions from C++ libraries and vice versa.

FFI should require a minimum of boilerplate.

FFI should not require deep expertise.

While making Rust functions callable from C++ is a goal, this analysis focuses on making C++ functions available to Rust so that new Rust code can be added while taking advantage of existing implementations in C++. To that end, we look at exported C++ functions and consider existing and planned compatibility with Rust via the C ABI and compatibility libraries. Types are extracted by running objdump on shared libraries to find external C++ functions they use¹ and running c++filt to parse the C++ types. This gives functions and their arguments. It does not consider return values, but a preliminary analysis² of those revealed that they would not significantly affect the results. We then classify each of these types into one of the following buckets: Supported by bindgen These are generally simple types involving primitives (including pointers and references to them). For these types, Rust’s existing FFI will handle them correctly, and Android’s build system will auto-generate the bindings. Supported by cxx compat crate These are handled by the cxx crate. This currently includes std::string, std::vector, and C++ methods (including pointers/references to these types). Users simply have to define the types and functions they want to share across languages and cxx will generate the code to do that safely. Native support These types are not directly supported, but the interfaces that use them have been manually reworked to add Rust support. Specifically, this includes types used by AIDL and protobufs. We have also implemented a native interface for StatsD as the existing C++ interface relies on method overloading, which is not well supported by bindgen and cxx³. Usage of this system does not show up in the analysis because the C++ API does not use any unique types. Potential addition to cxx This is currently common data structures such as std::optional and std::chrono::duration and custom string and vector implementations. These can either be supported natively by a future contribution to cxx, or by using its ExternType facilities. We have only included types in this category that we believe are relatively straightforward to implement and have a reasonable chance of being accepted into the cxx project. We don't need/intend to support Some types are exposed in today’s C++ APIs that are either an implicit part of the API, not an API we expect to want to use from Rust, or are language specific. Examples of types we do not intend to support include:

Mutexes - we expect that locking will take place in one language or the other, rather than needing to pass mutexes between languages, as per our coarse-grained philosophy.

native_handle - this is a JNI interface type, so it is inappropriate for use in Rust/C++ communication.

std::locale& - Android uses a separate locale system from C++ locales. This type primarily appears in output due to e.g., cout usage, which would be inappropriate to use in Rust.

Overall, this category represents types that we do not believe a Rust developer should be using. HIDL Android is in the process of deprecating HIDL and migrating to AIDL for HALs for new services.We’re also migrating some existing implementations to stable AIDL. Our current plan is to not support HIDL, preferring to migrate to stable AIDL instead. These types thus currently fall into the “We don't need/intend to support'' bucket above, but we break them out to be more specific. If there is sufficient demand for HIDL support, we may revisit this decision later. Other This contains all types that do not fit into any of the above buckets. It is currently mostly std::string being passed by value, which is not supported by cxx. Top C++ libraries One of the primary reasons for supporting interop is to allow reuse of existing code. With this in mind, we determined the most commonly used C++ libraries in Android: liblog, libbase, libutils, libcutils, libhidlbase, libbinder, libhardware, libz, libcrypto, and libui. We then analyzed all of the external C++ functions used by these libraries and their arguments to determine how well they would interoperate with Rust. Chart

Overall, 81% of types are in the first three categories (which we currently fully support) and 87% are in the first four categories (which includes those we believe we can easily support). Almost all of the remaining types are those we believe we do not need to support. Mainline modules In addition to analyzing popular C++ libraries, we also examined Mainline modules. Supporting this context is critical as Android is migrating some of its core functionality to Mainline, including much of the native code we hope to augment with Rust. Additionally, their modularity presents an opportunity for interop support. We analyzed 64 binaries and libraries in 21 modules. For each analyzed library we examined their used C++ functions and analyzed the types of their arguments to determine how well they would interoperate with Rust in the same way we did above for the top 10 libraries. Chart

Here 88% of types are in the first three categories and 90% in the first four, with almost all of the remaining being types we do not need to handle. Analysis of Rust/C++ Interop in AOSP With almost a year of Rust development in AOSP behind us, and more than a hundred thousand lines of code written in Rust, we can now examine how our original analysis has held up based on how C/C++ code is currently called from Rust in AOSP.⁴ Chart

The results largely match what we expected from our analysis with bindgen handling the majority of interop needs. Extensive use of AIDL by the new Keystore2 service results in the primary difference between our original analysis and actual Rust usage in the “Native Support” category.A few current examples of interop are:

Cxx in Bluetooth - While Rust is intended to be the primary language for Bluetooth, migrating from the existing C/C++ implementation will happen in stages. Using cxx allows the Bluetooth team to more easily serve legacy protocols like HIDL until they are phased out by using the existing C++ support to incrementally migrate their service.

AIDL in keystore - Keystore implements AIDL services and interacts with apps and other services over AIDL. Providing this functionality would be difficult to support with tools like cxx or bindgen, but the native AIDL support is simple and ergonomic to use.

Manually-written wrappers in profcollectd - While our goal is to provide seamless interop for most use cases, we also want to demonstrate that, even when auto-generated interop solutions are not an option, manually creating them can be simple and straightforward. Profcollectd is a small daemon that only exists on non-production engineering builds. Instead of using cxx it uses some small manually-written C wrappers around C++ libraries that it then passes to bindgen.

Conclusion Bindgen and cxx provide the vast majority of Rust/C++ interoperability needed by Android. For some of the exceptions, such as AIDL, the native version provides convenient interop between Rust and other languages. Manually written wrappers can be used to handle the few remaining types and functions not supported by other options as well as to create ergonomic Rust APIs. Overall, we believe interoperability between Rust and C++ is already largely sufficient for convenient use of Rust within Android. If you are considering how Rust could integrate into your C++ project, we recommend doing a similar analysis of your codebase. When addressing interop gaps, we recommend that you consider upstreaming support to existing compat libraries like cxx. Acknowledgements Our first attempt at quantifying Rust/C++ interop involved analyzing the potential mismatches between the languages. This led to a lot of interesting information, but was difficult to draw actionable conclusions from. Rather than enumerating all the potential places where interop could occur, Stephen Hines suggested that we instead consider how code is currently shared between C/C++ projects as a reasonable proxy for where we’ll also likely want interop for Rust. This provided us with actionable information that was straightforward to prioritize and implement. Looking back, the data from our real-world Rust usage has reinforced that the initial methodology was sound. Thanks Stephen!

Also, thanks to:

Andrei Homescu and Stephen Crane for contributing AIDL support to AOSP.

Ivan Lozano for contributing protobuf support to AOSP.

David Tolnay for publishing cxx and accepting our contributions.

The many authors and contributors to bindgen.

Jeff Vander Stoep and Adrian Taylor for contributions to this post.

We used undefined symbols of function type as reported by objdump to perform this analysis. This means that any header-only functions will be absent from our analysis, and internal (non-API) functions which are called by header-only functions may appear in it. ↩
We extracted return values by parsing DWARF symbols, which give the return types of functions. ↩
Even without automated binding generation, manually implementing the bindings is straightforward. ↩
In the case of handwritten C/C++ wrappers, we analyzed the functions they call, not the wrappers themselves. For all uses of our native AIDL library, we analyzed the types used in the C++ version of the library. ↩

Verifiable Supply Chain Metadata for Tekton

June 8, 2021

Posted by Dan Lorenc, Priya Wadhwa, Open Source Security Team
software supply chain attacksTektonTekton Chains

Definitions or “boxes and arrows”
Just like everything in your high school physics class, a CI/CD pipeline can be modeled as a series of boxes. Each box has some inputs, some outputs, and some steps that happen in the middle. Even if you have one big complicated bash script that fetches dependencies, builds programs, runs tests, downloads the internet and deploys to production, you can draw boxes and arrows to represent this flow. The boxes might be really big, but you can do it.

Since the initial whiteboard sketches, the Pipeline and Task CRDs in Tekton were designed to allow users to define each step of their pipeline at a granular level. These types include support for mandatory declared inputs, outputs, and build environments. This means you can track exactly what sources went into a build, what tools were used during the build itself and what artifacts came out at the end. By breaking up a large monolithic pipeline into a series of smaller, reusable steps, you can increase visibility into the overall system. This makes it easier to understand your exposure to supply chain attacks, detect issues when they do happen and recover from them after.

Explicit transitions
After a pipeline is defined, there are a few approaches to orchestrating it: level-triggered and edge-triggered. Like most of the Kubernetes ecosystem, Tekton is designed to operate in a level-triggered fashion. This means steps are executed explicitly by a central orchestrator which runs one task, waits for completion, then decides what to do next. In edge-based systems, a pipeline definition would be translated into a set of events and listeners. Each step fires off events when it completes, and these events are then picked up by listeners which run the next set of steps.

Event-based or edge-triggered systems are easy to reason about, but can be tricky to manage at scale. They also make it much harder to track an artifact as it flows through the entire system. Each step in the pipeline only knows about the one immediately before it; no step is responsible for tracking the entire execution. This can become problematic when you try to understand the security posture of your delivery pipeline.

Tekton was designed with the opposite approach in mind - level-triggered. Instead of a Rube-Goldberg machine tied together with duct tape and clothespins, Tekton is more like an explicit assembly-line. Level-triggered systems like Tekton move from state-to-state in a calculated manner by a central orchestrator. They require more explicit-design up front, but they are easier to observe and reason about after. Supply chains that use systems like Tekton are more secure.

Secure delivery pipeline through chains and provenance
So how do these two design decisions combine to make supply chain security easier? Enter Tekton Chains.

By observing the execution of a Task or a Pipeline and paying careful attention to the inputs, outputs, and steps along the way, we can make it easier to track down what happened and why later on. This "observer" can be run in a separate trust domain and cryptographically sign all of this captured metadata as it's stored, leaving a tamper-proof activity ledger. This technique is called "verifiable builds." This securely generated metadata can be used in a number of ways, from audit logging to recovering from security breaches to pre-deployment policy enforcement.

You can install Chains into any Tekton-enabled cluster and configure it to generate this cryptographically-signed supply chain metadata for your builds. Chains supports pluggable signature systems like PGP, x509 and Cloud KMS's. Payloads can be generated in a few different industry-standard formats like the RedHat Simple-Signing and the In-Toto Provenance specifications. The full documentation is available here, but you can get started quickly with something like this:

For this tutorial, you’ll need access to a GKE Kubernetes cluster and a GCR registry with push credentials. The cluster should already have Tekton Pipelines installed.

Install Tekton Chains into your cluster:

$ kubectl apply --filename https://storage.googleapis.com/tekton-releases/chains/latest/release.yaml

Next, you’ll set up registry authentication for the Tekton Chains controller, so that it can push OCI image signatures to your registry. To set up authentication, you’ll create a Service Account and download credentials:

$ export PROJECT_ID=<GCP Project ID>

$ gcloud iam service-accounts create tekton-chains

$ gcloud iam service-accounts keys create credentials.json --iam-account=tekton-chains@${PROJECT_ID}.iam.gserviceaccount.com

Now, create a Kubernetes Secret from your credentials file so the Chains controller can access it:

$ kubectl create secret docker-registry registry-credentials \

--docker-server=gcr.io \

--docker-username=_json_key \

--docker-email=tekton@chains.com \

--docker-password="$(cat credentials.json)" \

-n tekton-chains

$ kubectl patch serviceaccount tekton-chains-controller \

-p "{\"imagePullSecrets\": [{\"name\": \"registry-credentials\"}]}" -n tekton-chains

We can use cosign to generate a keypair as a Kubernetes secret, which the Chains controller will use for signing. Cosign will ask for a password, which will be stored in the secret:

$ cosign generate-key-pair -k8s tekton-chains/signing-secrets

Next, you’ll need to set up authentication to your GCR registry for the kaniko task as another Kubernetes Secret.

$ export CREDENTIALS_SECRET=kaniko-credentials

$ kubectl create secret generic $CREDENTIALS_SECRET --from-file credentials.json

Now, we’ll create a kaniko-chains task which will build and push a container image to your registry. Tekton Chains will recognize that an image has been built, and sign it automatically.

$ kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/tektoncd/chains/main/examples/kaniko/gcp/kaniko.yaml

$ cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -

apiVersion: tekton.dev/v1beta1

kind: TaskRun

metadata:

name: kaniko-run

spec:

taskRef:

name: kaniko-gcp

params:

- name: IMAGE

value: gcr.io/${PROJECT_ID}/kaniko-chains

workspaces:

- name: source

emptyDir: {}

- name: credentials

secret:

secretName: ${CREDENTIALS_SECRET}

EOF

Wait for the TaskRun to complete, and give the Tekton Chains controller a few seconds to sign the image and store the signature. You should be able to verify the signature with cosign and your public key:

$ cosign verify -key cosign.pub gcr.io/${PROJECT_ID}/kaniko-chains

Congratulations! You’ve successfully signed and verified an OCI image with Tekton Chains and cosign.

What's Next
Within Chains, we'll be improving integration with other supply-chain security projects. This includes support for Binary Transparency and Verifiable Builds through integrations with the Sigstore and In-Toto projects. We'll also be improving and providing a set of well-designed, highly secure Tasks and Pipeline definitions in the TektonCD Catalog.

In Tekton Pipelines, we plan on finishing up TEP-0025 (Hermekton) to enable the support for hermetic build execution. If you want to play around with it now, hermekton can be run as an alpha feature in experimental mode. When hermekton is enabled, a build runs in a locked-down environment without network connectivity. Hermetic builds guarantee all inputs have been explicitly declared ahead-of-time, providing for a more auditable supply-chain. Hermetic builds and Chains align well, because the hermeticity build property is contained in the full build provenance captured by Chains. Chains can generate and attest to metadata specifying exactly which sections of a build had network access.

This means policy can be defined around exactly which build tools are allowed to access the network and which ones are not. This metadata can be used in policies at build time (banning compilers with security vulnerabilities) or stored and used by policy engines at deploy time (only code-reviewed and verifiably built containers are allowed to run).

We believe supply-chain security must be built-in and by default. No task orchestrator can promise perfect supply-chain security, but TektonCD was designed with unique features in mind that make it easier to do the right thing. We're always looking for feedback on the design, goals and requirements. You can reach out on GitHub or the #chains Slack channel.

Announcing New Abuse Research Grants Program

June 4, 2021

Posted by Anna Hupa, Marc Henson, and Martin Straka, Google VRP Team

product abuseVulnerability Research Grantsincreased our rewards@xdavidhuehpus.com@nowaskyjrProduct Abuse

We invite our top abuse researchers to the program.

We award grants immediately before research begins, no strings attached.

Bug Hunters apply for the targets we share with them and start their research.

On top of the grant, researchers are eligible for regular rewards for the bugs they discover in scope of our Bug Bounty program.

To learn more about this and other grant programs, visit our rules page.

New protections for Enhanced Safe Browsing users in Chrome

June 3, 2021

Posted by Badr Salmi, Google Safe Browsing & Varun Khaneja, Chrome Security In 2020 we launched Enhanced Safe Browsing, which you can turn on in your Chrome security settings, with the goal of substantially increasing safety on the web. These improvements are being built on top of existing security mechanisms that already protect billions of devices. Since the initial launch, we have continuously worked behind the scenes to improve our real-time URL checks and apply machine learning models to warn on previously-unknown attacks. As a result, Enhanced Safe Browsing users are successfully phished 35% less than other users. Starting with Chrome 91, we will roll out new features to help Enhanced Safe Browsing users better choose their extensions, as well as offer additional protections against downloading malicious files on the web. Chrome extensions - Better protection before installation Every day millions of people rely on Chrome extensions to help them be more productive, save money, shop or simply improve their browser experience. This is why it is important for us to continuously improve the safety of extensions published in the Chrome Web Store. For instance, through our integration with Google Safe Browsing in 2020, the number of malicious extensions that Chrome disabled to protect users grew by 81%. This comes on top of a number of improvements for more peace of mind when it comes to privacy and security.

Enhanced Safe Browsing will now offer additional protection when you install a new extension from the Chrome Web Store. A dialog will inform you if an extension you’re about to install is not a part of the list of extensions trusted by Enhanced Safe Browsing. Any extensions built by a developer who follows the Chrome Web Store Developer Program Policies, will be considered trusted by Enhanced Safe Browsing. For new developers, it will take at least a few months of respecting these conditions to become trusted. Eventually, we strive for all developers with compliant extensions to reach this status upon meeting these criteria. Today, this represents nearly 75% of all extensions in the Chrome Web Store and we expect this number to keep growing as new developers become trusted. Improved download protection Enhanced Safe Browsing will now offer you even better protection against risky files. bad_file.exe may be dangerous. Send to Google for scanning?

bad_file.exe may be dangerous. Send to Google for scanning?

When you download a file, Chrome performs a first level check with Google Safe Browsing using metadata about the downloaded file, such as the digest of the contents and the source of the file, to determine whether it’s potentially suspicious. For any downloads that Safe Browsing deems risky, but not clearly unsafe, Enhanced Safe Browsing users will be presented with a warning and the ability to send the file to be scanned for a more in depth analysis (pictured above). If you choose to send the file, Chrome will upload it to Google Safe Browsing, which will scan it using its static and dynamic analysis classifiers in real time. After a short wait, if Safe Browsing determines the file is unsafe, Chrome will display a warning. As always, you can bypass the warning and open the file without scanning. Uploaded files are deleted from Safe Browsing a short time after scanning.

Introducing Security By Design

May 26, 2021

Posted by Jon Markoff and Sean Smith, Android Security and Privacy Team

Integrating security into your app development lifecycle can save a lot of time, money, and risk. That’s why we’ve launched Security by Design on Google Play Academy to help developers identify, mitigate, and proactively protect against security threats.

The Android ecosystem, including Google Play, has many built-in security features that help protect developers and users. The course Introduction to app security best practices takes these protections one step further by helping you take advantage of additional security features to build into your app. For example, Jetpack Security helps developers properly encrypt their data at rest and provides only safe and well known algorithms for encrypting Files and SharedPreferences. The SafetyNet Attestation API is a solution to help identify potentially dangerous patterns in usage. There are several common design vulnerabilities that are important to look out for, including using shared or improper file storage, using insecure protocols, unprotected components such as Activities, and more. The course also provides methods to test your app in order to help you keep it safe after launch. Finally, you can set up a Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP) to engage security researchers to help.

In the next course, you can learn how to integrate security at every stage of the development process by adopting the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL). The SDL is an industry standard process and in this course you’ll learn the fundamentals of setting up a program, getting executive sponsorship and integration into your development lifecycle.

Threat modeling is part of the Security Development Lifecycle, and in this course you will learn to think like an attacker to identify, categorize, and address threats. By doing so early in the design phase of development, you can identify potential threats and start planning for how to mitigate them at a much lower cost and create a more secure product for your users.

Improving your app’s security is a never ending process. Sign up for the Security by Design module where in a few short courses, you will learn how to integrate security into your app development lifecycle, model potential threats, and app security best practices into your app, as well as avoid potential design pitfalls.

Introducing Half-Double: New hammering technique for DRAM Rowhammer bug

May 25, 2021

Research Team: Salman Qazi, Yoongu Kim, Nicolas Boichat, Eric Shiu & Mattias Nissler
Half-DoublepaperexploitTRRespassSMASH

Google has been working with JEDEC, an independent semiconductor engineering trade organization, along with other industry partners, in search of possible solutions for the Rowhammer phenomenon. JEDEC has published two documents about DRAM and system-level mitigation techniques (JEP 300-1 and JEP301-1).

We are disclosing this work because we believe that it significantly advances the understanding of the Rowhammer phenomenon, and that it will help both researchers and industry partners to work together, to develop lasting solutions. The challenge is substantial and the ramifications are industry-wide. We encourage all stakeholders (server, client, mobile, automotive, IoT) to join the effort to develop a practical and effective solution that benefits all of our users.

Integrating Rust Into the Android Open Source Project

May 11, 2021

Posted by Ivan Lozano, Android Team

The Android team has been working on introducing the Rust programming language into the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) since 2019 as a memory-safe alternative for platform native code development. As with any large project, introducing a new language requires careful consideration. For Android, one important area was assessing how to best fit Rust into Android’s build system. Currently this means the Soong build system (where the Rust support resides), but these design decisions and considerations are equally applicable for Bazel when AOSP migrates to that build system. This post discusses some of the key design considerations and resulting decisions we made in integrating Rust support into Android’s build system. Rust integration into large projects A RustConf 2019 meeting on Rust usage within large organizations highlighted several challenges, such as the risk that eschewing Cargo in favor of using the Rust Compiler, rustc, directly (see next section) may remove organizations from the wider Rust community. We share this same concern. When changes to imported third-party crates might be beneficial to the wider community, our goal is to upstream those changes. Likewise when crates developed for Android could benefit the wider Rust community, we hope to release them as independent crates. We believe that the success of Rust within Android is dependent on minimizing any divergence between Android and the Rust community at large, and hope that the Rust community will benefit from Android’s involvement. No nested build systems Rust provides Cargo as the default build system and package manager, collecting dependencies and invoking rustc (the Rust compiler) to build the target crate (Rust package). Soong takes this role instead in Android and calls rustc directly for several reasons:

In Cargo, C dependencies are handled independently in an ad-hoc manner via build.rs scripts. Soong already provides a mechanism for building C libraries and defining them as dependencies, and Android carefully controls the compiler version and global compilation flags to ensure libraries are built a particular way. Relying on Cargo would introduce a second non-Soong mechanism for defining/building C libraries that would not be constrained by the carefully selected compilation controls implemented in Soong. This could also lead to multiple different versions of the same library, negatively impacting memory/disk usage.

Calling compilers directly through Soong provides the stability and control Android requires for the variety of build configurations it supports (for example, specifying where target-specific dependencies are and which compilation flags to use). While it would technically be possible to achieve the necessary level of control over rustc indirectly through Cargo, Soong would have no understanding of how the Cargo.toml (the Cargo build file) would influence the commands Cargo emits to rustc. Paired with the fact that Cargo evolves independently, this would severely restrict Soong’s ability to precisely control how build artifacts are created.

Builds which are self-contained and insensitive to the host configuration, known as hermetic builds, are necessary for Android to produce reproducible builds. Cargo, which relies on build.rs scripts, doesn’t yet provide hermeticity guarantees.

Incremental builds are important to maintain engineering productivity; building Android takes a considerable amount of resources. Cargo was not designed for integration into existing build systems and does not expose its compilation units. Each Cargo invocation builds the entire crate dependency graph for a given Cargo.toml, rebuilding crates multiple times across projects¹. This is too coarse for integration into Soong’s incremental build support, which expects smaller compilation units. This support is necessary to scale up Rust usage within Android.

Using the Rust compiler directly allows us to avoid these issues and is consistent with how we compile all other code in AOSP. It provides the most control over the build process and eases integration into Android’s existing build system. Unfortunately, avoiding it introduces several challenges and influences many other build system decisions because Cargo usage is so deeply ingrained in the Rust crate ecosystem.

No build.rs scripts

A build.rs script compiles to a Rust binary which Cargo builds and executes during a build to handle pre-build tasks, commonly setting up the build environment, or building libraries in other languages (for example C/C++). This is analogous to configure scripts used for other languages.

Avoiding build.rs scripts somewhat flows naturally from not relying on Cargo since supporting these would require replicating Cargo behavior and assumptions. Beyond this however, there are good reasons for AOSP to avoid build scripts as well:

For instances in third-party code where a build script is used only to compile C dependencies, we either use existing cc_library Soong definitions (such as boringssl for quiche) or create new definitions for crate-specific code. When the build.rs is used to generate source, we try to replicate the core functionality in a Soong rust_binary module for use as a custom source generator. In other cases where Soong can provide the information without source generation, we may carry a small patch that leverages this information. Why proc_macro but not build.rs? Why do we support proc_macros, which are compiler plug-ins that execute code on the host within the compiler context, but not build.rs scripts? While build.rs code is written as one-off code to handle building a single crate, proc_macros define reusable functionality within the compiler which can become widely relied upon across the Rust community. As a result popular proc_macros are generally better maintained and more scrutinized upstream, which makes the code review process more manageable. They are also more readily sandboxed as part of the build process since they are less likely to have dependencies external to the compiler. proc_macros are also a language feature rather than a method for building code. These are relied upon by source code, are unavoidable for third-party dependencies, and are useful enough to define and use within our platform code. While we can avoid build.rs by leveraging our build system, the same can’t be said of proc_macros. There is also precedence for compiler plugin support within the Android build system. For example see Soong’s java_plugin modules. Generated source as crates Unlike C/C++ compilers, rustc only accepts a single source file representing an entry point to a binary or library. It expects that the source tree is structured such that all required source files can be automatically discovered. This means that generated source either needs to be placed in the source tree or provided through an include directive in source: include!("/path/to/hello.rs"); The Rust community depends on build.rs scripts alongside assumptions about the Cargo build environment to get around this limitation. When building, the cargo command sets an OUT_DIR environment variable which build.rs scripts are expected to place generated source code in. This source can then be included via: include!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/hello.rs")); This presents a challenge for Soong as outputs for each module are placed in their own out/ directory²; there is no single OUT_DIR where dependencies output their generated source. For platform code, we prefer to package generated source into a crate that can be imported. There are a few reasons to favor this approach:

Prevent generated source file names from colliding.

Reduce boilerplate code checked-in throughout the tree and which needs to be maintained. Any boilerplate necessary to make the generated source compile into a crate can be centrally maintained.

Avoid implicit³ interactions between generated code and the surrounding crate.

Reduce pressure on memory and disk by dynamically liking commonly used generated sources.

As a result, all of Android’s Rust source generation module types produce code that can be compiled and used as a crate.

We still support third-party crates without modification by copying all the generated source dependencies for a module into a single per-module directory similar to Cargo. Soong then sets the OUT_DIR environment variable to that directory when compiling the module so the generated source can be found. However we discourage use of this mechanism in platform code unless absolutely necessary for the reasons described above.

Dynamic linkage by default

By default, the Rust ecosystem assumes that crates will be statically linked into binaries. The usual benefits of dynamic libraries are upgrades (whether for security or functionality) and decreased memory usage. Rust’s lack of a stable binary interface and usage of cross-crate information flow prevents upgrading libraries without upgrading all dependent code. Even when the same crate is used by two different programs on the system, it is unlikely to be provided by the same shared object⁴ due to the precision with which Rust identifies its crates. This makes Rust binaries more portable but also results in larger disk and memory footprints.

This is problematic for Android devices where resources like memory and disk usage must be carefully managed because statically linking all crates into Rust binaries would result in excessive code duplication (especially in the standard library). However, our situation is also different from the standard host environment: we build Android using global decisions about dependencies. This means that nearly every crate is shareable between all users of that crate. Thus, we opt to link crates dynamically by default for device targets. This reduces the overall memory footprint of Rust in Android by allowing crates to be reused across multiple binaries which depend on them.

Since this is unusual in the Rust community, not all third-party crates support dynamic compilation. Sometimes we must carry small patches while we work with upstream maintainers to add support.

Current Status of Build Support

We support building all output types supported by rustc (rlibs, dylibs, proc_macros, cdylibs, staticlibs, and executables). Rust modules can automatically request the appropriate crate linkage for a given dependency (rlib vs dylib). C and C++ modules can depend on Rust cdylib or staticlib producing modules the same way as they would for a C or C++ library.

In addition to being able to build Rust code, Android’s build system also provides support for protobuf and gRPC and AIDL generated crates. First-class bindgen support makes interfacing with existing C code simple and we have support modules using cxx for tighter integration with C++ code.

The Rust community produces great tooling for developers, such as the language server rust-analyzer. We have integrated support for rust-analyzer into the build system so that any IDE which supports it can provide code completion and goto definitions for Android modules.

Source-based code coverage builds are supported to provide platform developers high level signals on how well their code is covered by tests. Benchmarks are supported as their own module type, leveraging the criterion crate to provide performance metrics. In order to maintain a consistent style and level of code quality, a default set of clippy lints and rustc lints are enabled by default. Additionally, HWASAN/ASAN fuzzers are supported, with the HWASAN rustc support added to upstream.

In the near future, we plan to add documentation to source.android.com on how to define and use Rust modules in Soong. We expect Android’s support for Rust to continue evolving alongside the Rust ecosystem and hope to continue to participate in discussions around how Rust can be integrated into existing build systems.

Thank you to Matthew Maurer, Jeff Vander Stoep, Joel Galenson, Manish Goregaokar, and Tyler Mandry for their contributions to this post.

Notes

This can be mitigated to some extent with workspaces, but requires a very specific directory arrangement that AOSP does not conform to. ↩
This presents no problem for C/C++ and similar languages as the path to the generated source is provided directly to the compiler. ↩
Since include! works by textual inclusion, it may reference values from the enclosing namespace, modify the namespace, or use constructs like #![foo]. These implicit interactions can be difficult to maintain. Macros should be preferred if interaction with the rest of the crate is truly required. ↩
While libstd would usually be shareable for the same compiler revision, most other libraries would end up with several copies for Cargo-built Rust binaries, since each build would attempt to use a minimum feature set and may select different dependency versions for the library in question. Since information propagates across crate boundaries, you cannot simply produce a “most general” instance of that library. ↩

Making the Internet more secure one signed container at a time

May 6, 2021

Posted by Priya Wadhwa, Jake Sanders, Google Open Source Security Team
`distroless` base imagesIntroducing Cosign Cosignsigstore projectperforming this checkHow it works
To start signing distroless we integrated cosign into the distroless CI system, which builds and pushes images via Cloud Build. Signing every distroless image was as easy as adding an additional Cloud Build step to the Cloud Build job responsible for building and pushing the images. This additional step uses the cosign container image and a key pair stored in GCP KMS to sign every distroless image. With this additional signing step, users can now verify that the distroless image they’re running was built in the correct CI environment.

Right now, cosign can be run as an image or as a CLI tool. It supports:

Hardware and KMS signing
Bring-your-own PKI
Our free OIDC PKI (Fulcio)
Built-in binary transparency and timestamping service (Rekor)

Signing distroless with cosign is just the beginning, and we plan to incorporate other sigstore technologies into distroless to continue to improve it over the next few months. We also can’t wait to integrate sigstore with other critical projects. Stay tuned here for updates! To get started verifying your own distrolesss images, check out the distroless README and to learn more about sigstore, check out sigstore.dev.

Enabling Hardware-enforced Stack Protection (cetcompat) in Chrome

May 4, 2021

Alex Gough, Engineer, Chrome Platform Security Team Chrome 90 for Windows adopts Hardware-enforced Stack Protection, a mitigation technology to make the exploitation of security bugs more difficult for attackers. This is supported by Windows 20H1 (December Update) or later, running on processors with Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) such as Intel 11th Gen or AMD Zen 3 CPUs. With this mitigation the processor maintains a new, protected, stack of valid return addresses (a shadow stack). This improves security by making exploits more difficult to write. However, it may affect stability if software that loads itself into Chrome is not compatible with the mitigation. Below we describe some exploitation techniques that are mitigated by stack protection, discuss its limitations and what we will do next to approach them. Finally, we provide some quick tips for other software authors as they enable /cetcompat for their Windows applications. Stack Protection Imagine a simple use-after-free (UAF) bug where an attacker can induce a program to call a pointer of their choosing. Here the attacker controls an object which occupies space formerly used by another object, which the program erroneously continues to use. The attacker sets a field in this region that is used as a function call to the address of code the attacker would like to execute. Years ago an attacker could simply write their shellcode to a known location, then, in their overwrite, set the instruction pointer to this shellcode. In time, Data Execution Prevention was added to prevent stacks or heaps from being executable. In response, attackers invented Return Oriented Programming (ROP). Here, attackers take advantage of the process’s own code, as that must be executable. With control of the stack (either to write values there, or by changing the stack pointer) and control of the instruction pointer, an attacker can use the `ret` instruction to jump to a different, useful, piece of code.

During an exploit attempt, the instruction pointer is changed so that instead of its normal destination, a small fragment of code, called an ROP gadget, is invoked instead. These gadgets are selected so that they do something useful (such as prepare a register for a function call) then call return. These tiny fragments need not be a complete function in the normal program, and could even be found part-way through a legitimate instruction. By lining up the right set of “return” addresses, a chain of these gadgets can be called, with each gadget’s `ret` switching to the next gadget. With some patience, or the right tooling, an attacker can piece together the arguments to a function call, then really call the function. Chrome has a multi-process architecture -- a main browser process acts as the logged-in user, and spawns restricted renderer and utility processes to host website code. This isolation reduces the severity of a bug in a renderer as its process cannot do much by itself. Attackers will then attempt to use another sandbox escape bug to run code in the browser, which lets them act as the logged-in user. As libraries are mapped at the same address in different processes by Windows, any bug that allows an attacker to read memory is enough for them to examine Chrome’s binary and any loaded libraries for ROP gadgets. This makes preventing ROP chains in the browser process especially useful as a mitigation. Enter stack-protection. Along with the existing stack, the cpu maintains a shadow stack. This stack cannot be directly manipulated by normal program code and only stores return addresses. The CALL instruction is modified to push a return address (the instruction after the CALL) to both the normal stack, and the shadow stack. The RET (return) instruction still takes its return address from the normal stack, but now verifies that it is the same as the one stored in the shadow stack region. If it is, then the program is left alone and it continues to work as it always did. If the addresses do not match then an exception is raised which is intercepted by the operating system (not by Chrome). The operating system has an opportunity to modify the shadow region and allow the program to continue, but in most cases an address mismatch is the result of a program error so the program is immediately terminated.

In our example above, the attacker will be able to make their initial jump into a ROP gadget, but on trying to return to their next gadget they will be stopped. Some software may be incompatible with this mechanism, especially some older security software that injects into a process and hooks operating system functions by overwriting the prelude with `rax = &hook; push rax; ret`. Limitations Chrome does not yet support every direction of control flow enforcement. Stack protection enforces the reverse-edge of the call graph but does not constrain the forward-edge. It will still be possible to make indirect jumps around existing code as stack protection is only validated when a return instruction is encountered, and call targets are not validated. On Windows a technology called Control Flow Guard (CFG) can be used to verify the target of an indirect function call before it is attempted. This prevents calling into the middle of a function, significantly reducing the scope of useful instructions for attackers to use. Another approach is provided by Intel’s CET which includes an ENDBRANCH instruction to prevent jumps into arbitrary code locations. Memory tagging tools such as MTE can be used to make it more difficult to modify pointers to valid code sequences (and makes UAFs more difficult in general). We are working to introduce CFG to Chrome for Windows, and will add other techniques over time. By itself, stack protection can be bypassed in some contexts. For instance, stack protection does not prevent an attacker tricking a program into calling an existing function by entirely replacing an object containing a function pointer. This approach does not involve ROP as the function call happens instead of the expected call, and returns to the address it was originally called from, so must be allowed. However, the called function must be useful to an attacker, and most functions will not be. An example of an attack using this method is to craft a call to add the `--no-sandbox` argument to Chrome’s command line. This results in future renderers being launched without normal protections. Over time we will identify and remove such useful tools. In the renderer, for performance reasons, our javascript and wasm engines may use memory that is both writable and executable at the same time. This allows an attacker to modify code that v8 is already going to execute, saving them the trouble of constructing a ROP chain. This explains why it was not our first priority to make v8 CET compatible, and why stack-protection is not yet enabled in the renderer. Finally, stack protection doesn’t stop the bugs in the first place. Everything we have discussed above is a mitigation that makes it more difficult to execute arbitrary code. If a programming error allows arbitrary writes then it is very unlikely that we can prevent this being used to run arbitrary code. Attackers will adapt and find new ways to turn memory safety errors into code execution. Debugging Tips You can see if Hardware-enforced Stack Protection is enabled for a process using the Windows Task Manager. Open task manager, open the Details Tab, Right Click on a heading, Select Columns & Check the Hardware-enforced Stack Protection box. The process display will then indicate if a process is opted-in to this mitigation. ‘Compatible Modules Only’ indicates that any dll marked as /cetcompat at build time will raise an exception if a return address is invalid.

You can see which Chrome processes are opted-out of CET by consulting the Mitigations field of chrome://sandbox and clicking ‘+’. All processes are included unless the mitigation CET_USER_SHADOW_STACKS_ALWAYS_OFF is present in the expanded details view. If you are developing software, or debugging a problem in Chrome the shadow stack can be helpful as it includes only return addresses, and these cannot be corrupted by rogue writes elsewhere in the process. To see these registers use the `r` command in windbg with the mask option: 0:159> rM 8002 rax=00000000c000060a rbx=000000fa5bbfeff0 rcx=0000000000000030 rdx=0000000000000000 rsi=00007ffba4118924 rdi=000000fa5bbff1a0 rip=00007ffc1847b4a1 rsp=000000fa5bbfc0a0 rbp=000000fa5bbfc0a0 r8=000000fa5bbfc098 r9=0000000000000000 r10=0000000000000000 r11=0000000000000246 r12=000000fa5bbfe230 r13=000002c3450b5830 r14=000002c3450b7850 r15=000000fa5bbfc260 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na po nc ssp=000000fa5c3fef10 cetumsr=0000000000000001 `ssp` points to the shadow stack region, `cetumsr` indicates if cet is enabled for the process. You can then see the call stack within the shadow region using `dps @ssp`. Values are not overwritten so you can also see where you came from by looking a bit deeper: `dps @ssp-20`. If a process is not compatible with Hardware-enforced Stack Protection, the system event log (Application Log) will include brief error reports (Id:1001). You can filter those related to cetcompat using the following powershell snippet:- Get-WinEvent -MaxEvents 128 -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Application'; Id='1001' } ` | Where-Object {$_.Message -match 'chrome.exe'} ` | Select-Object -First 8 ` | fl These will include the following parameters:- P1: application.exe P2: application version P3: application build ts P4: faulting module .dll P5: faulting module version P6: faulting module build ts P7: faulting offset in P4 from base_address P8: exception code (c0000409) P9: subcode (00...000030) If Chrome is misbehaving and you think it might be because of cetcompat, it is possible to disable it using Image File Execution Options - we do not recommend this except for a limited period of testing. If you find you have to do this, please raise an issue on https://crbug.com so that we can investigate the failure. Further Reading

Intel ISA (Chapter 18)

Microsoft’s Developer Guidance

Excellent posts by Shamir & Ionescu: RIP ROP, CET On Xanax, & Dynamic CET

Summary /cetcompat is enabled for most processes for Chrome M90 on Windows. Enabling Hardware-enforced Stack Protection will layer with existing and future measures to make exploitation more difficult and so more expensive for an attacker, ultimately protecting the people who use Chrome every day.

How we fought bad apps and developers in 2020

April 21, 2021

Posted by Krish Vitaldevara, Director of Product Management Trust & Safety, Google Play

Providing safe experiences to billions of users and millions of Android developers has been one of the highest priorities for Google Play for many years. Last year we introduced new policies, improved our systems, and further optimized our processes to better protect our users, assist good developers and strengthen our guard against bad apps and developers. Additionally, in 2020, Google Play Protect scanned over 100B installed apps each day for malware across billions of devices. Users come to Google Play to find helpful, reliable apps on everything from COVID-19 vaccine information to new forms of entertainment, grocery delivery, communication and more. As such, we introduced a series of policies and new developer support to continue to elevate information quality on the platform and reduce the risk of user harm from misinformation.

COVID-19 apps requirements: To ensure public safety, information integrity and privacy, we introduced specific requirements for COVID-19 apps. Under these requirements, apps related to sensitive use cases, such as those providing testing information, must be endorsed by either official governmental entities or healthcare organizations and must meet a high standard for user data privacy.

News policy: To promote transparency in news publishing, we introduced minimum requirements that apps must meet in order for developers to declare their app as a “News” app on Google Play. These guidelines help promote user transparency and developer accountability by providing users with relevant information about the app.

Election support: We created teams and processes across Google Play focused on elections to provide additional support and adapt to the changing landscape. This includes support for government agencies, specially trained app reviewers, and a safety team to address election threats and abuse.

Our core efforts around identifying and mitigating bad apps and developers continued to evolve to address new adversarial behaviors and forms of abuse. Our machine-learning detection capabilities and enhanced app review processes prevented over 962k policy-violating app submissions from getting published to Google Play. We also banned 119k malicious and spammy developer accounts. Additionally, we significantly increased our focus on SDK enforcement, as we've found these violations have an outsized impact on security and user data privacy. Last year, we continued to reduce developer access to sensitive permissions. In February, we announced a new background location policy to ensure that apps requesting this permission need the data in order to provide clear user benefit. As a result of the new policy, developers now have to demonstrate that benefit and prominently tell users about it or face possible removal from Google Play. We've begun enforcement on apps not meeting new policy guidelines and will provide an update on the usage of this permission in a future blog post. We've also continued to invest in protecting kids and helping parents find great content. In 2020 we launched a new kids tab filled with “Teacher approved” apps. To evaluate apps, we teamed with academic experts and teachers across the country, including our lead advisors, Joe Blatt (Harvard Graduate School of Education) and Dr. Sandra Calvert (Georgetown University). As we continue to invest in protecting people from apps with harmful content, malicious behaviors, or threats to user privacy, we are also equally motivated to provide trusted experiences to Play developers. For example, we’ve improved our process for providing relevant information about enforcement actions we’ve taken, resulting in significant reduction in appeals and increased developer satisfaction. We will continue to enhance the speed and quality of our communications to developers, and continue listening to feedback about how we can further engage and elevate trusted developers. Android developers can expect to see more on this front in the coming year. Our global teams of product managers, engineers, policy experts, and operations leaders are more excited than ever to advance the safety of the platform and forge a sustaining trust with our users. We look forward to building an even better Google Play experience.

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