Google Online Security Blog: 12月 2019

Announcing updates to our Patch Rewards program in 2020

2019年12月18日

Posted by Jan Keller, Technical Program Manager, Security
Patch Rewards programIntroducing upfront financial helpafter the work is completed

We will start off with two support levels :

Small ($5,000): Meant to motivate and reward a project for fixing a small number of security issues. Examples: improvements to privilege separation or sandboxing, cleanup of integer artimetrics, or more generally fixing vulnerabilities identified in open source software by bug bounty programs such as EU-FOSSA 2 (see ‘Qualifying submissions’ here for more examples).
Large ($30,000): Meant to incentivize a larger project to invest heavily in security, e.g. providing support to find additional developers, or implement a significant new security feature (e.g. new compiler mitigations).

Nomination process

Anyone can nominate an open source project for support by filling out http://goo.gle/patchz-nomination. Our Patch Reward Panel will review submissions on a monthly basis and select a number of projects that meet the program criteria. The panel will let submitors know if a project has been chosen and will start working with the project maintainers directly.

Projects in scope

Any open source project can be nominated for support. When selecting projects, the panel will put an emphasis on projects that either are vital to the health of the Internet or are end-user projects with a large user base.

What do we expect in return?

We expect to see security improvements to open source software. Ideally, the project can provide us
with a short blurb or pointers to some of the completed work that was possible because of our support. We don’t want to add bureaucracy, but would like to measure the success of the program.
What about the existing Patch Rewards program?
This is an addition to the existing program, the current Patch Rewards program will continue as it stands today.

Protecting programmatic access to user data with Binary Authorization for Borg

2019年12月17日

Posted by Daniel Rebolledo Samper and Mark Lodato, Software Engineers, Security & Privacy
Borg
Binary Authorization for Borg is a deploy-time enforcement check
Binary Authorization for Borg, or BAB, is an internal deploy-time enforcement check that reduces insider risk by ensuring that production software and configuration deployed at Google is properly reviewed and authorized, especially when that code has the ability to access user data. BAB ensures that code and configuration deployments meet certain standards prior to being deployed. BAB includes both a deploy-time enforcement service to prevent unauthorized jobs from starting, and an audit trail of the code and configuration used in BAB-enabled jobs.

BAB ensures that Google's official software supply chain process is followed. First, a code change is reviewed and approved before being checked into Google's central source code repository. Next, the code is verifiably built and packaged using Google's central build system. This is done by creating the build in a secure sandbox and recording the package's origin in metadata for verification purposes. Finally, the job is deployed to Borg, with a job-specific identity. BAB rejects any package that lacks proper metadata, that did not follow the proper supply chain process, or that otherwise does not match the identity’s predefined policy.

Binary Authorization for Borg allows for several kinds of security checks

BAB can be used for many kinds of deploy-time security checks. Some examples include:

Is the binary built from checked in code?
Is the binary built verifiably?
Is the binary built from tested code?
Is the binary built from code intended to be used in the deployment?

After deployment, a job is continuously verified for its lifetime, to check that jobs that were started (and any that may still be running) conform to updates to their policies.

Binary Authorization for Borg provides other security benefits
Though the primary purpose of BAB is to limit the ability of a potentially malicious insider to run an unauthorized job that could access user data, BAB has other security benefits. BAB provides robust code identity for jobs in Google’s infrastructure, tying a job’s identity to specific code, and ensuring that only the specified code can be used to exercise the job identity’s privileges. This allows for a transition from a job identity—trusting an identity and any of its privileged human users transitively—to a code identity—trusting a specific piece of reviewed code to have specific semantics and which cannot be modified without an approval process.

BAB also dictates a common language for data protection, so that multiple teams can understand and meet the same requirements. Certain processes, such as those for financial reporting, need to meet certain change management requirements for compliance purposes. Using BAB, these checks can be automated, saving time and increasing the scope of coverage.

Binary Authorization for Borg is part of the BeyondProd model
BAB is one of several technologies used at Google to mitigate insider risk, and one piece of how we secure containers and microservices in production. By using containerized systems and verifying their BAB requirements prior to deployment, our systems are easier to debug, more reliable, and have a clearer change management process. More details on how Google has adopted a cloud-native security model are available in another whitepaper we are releasing today, “BeyondProd: A new approach to cloud-native security.”

In summary, implementing BAB, a deploy-time enforcement check, as part of Google’s containerized infrastructure and continuous integration and deployment (CI/CD) process has enabled us to verify that the code and configuration we deploy meet certain standards for security. Adopting BAB has allowed Google to reduce insider risk, prevent possible attacks, and also support the uniformity of our production systems. For more information about BAB, read our whitepaper, “Binary Authorization for Borg: how Google verifies code provenance and implements code identity.”

Additional contributors to this whitepaper include Kevin Chen, Software Engineer; Tim Dierks, Engineering Director; Maya Kaczorowski, Product Manager; Gary O’Connor, Technical Writing; Umesh Shankar, Principal Engineer; Adam Stubblefield, Distinguished Engineer; and Wilfried Teiken, Software Engineer; with special recognition to the entire Binary Authorization for Borg team for their ideation, engineering, and leadership

Better password protections in Chrome - How it works

2019年12月10日

Posted by Patrick Nepper, Kiran C. Nair, Vasilii Sukhanov and Varun Khaneja, Chrome TeamannouncedWarnings about compromised passwordsintroducedPassword Checkup extensionhere into the Google Accountpasswords.google.com

Whenever Google discovers a username and password exposed by another company’s data breach, we store a hashed and encrypted copy of the data on our servers with a secret key known only to Google.

When you sign in to a website, Chrome will send a hashed copy of your username and password to Google encrypted with a secret key only known to Chrome. No one, including Google, is able to derive your username or password from this encrypted copy.

In order to determine if your username and password appears in any breach, we use a technique called private set intersection with blinding that involves multiple layers of encryption. This allows us to compare your encrypted username and password with all of the encrypted breached usernames and passwords, without revealing your username and password, or revealing any information about any other users’ usernames and passwords. In order to make this computation more efficient, Chrome sends a 3-byte SHA256 hash prefix of your username to reduce the scale of the data joined from 4 billion records down to 250 records, while still ensuring your username remains anonymous.

Only you discover if your username and password have been compromised. If they have been compromised, Chrome will tell you, and we strongly encourage you to change your password.

Sync and Google Servicesthe PasswordLeakDetectionEnabled policy settingReal-time phishing protection: Checking with Safe Browsing’s blocklist in real time. Safe Browsing.Make searches and browsing betterUrlKeyedAnonymizedDataCollectionEnabled policy settingsExpanding predictive phishing protection launched

Detecting unsafe path access patterns with PathAuditor

2019年12月9日

Posted by Marta Rożek, Google Summer Intern 2019, and Stephen Röttger, Software Engineer #!/bin/sh
cat /home/user/footmpreaperif ((dst = malloc(strlen(ent->d_name) + 3)) == NULL) message (LOG_FATAL, "malloc failed.\n");
strcpy(dst, ent->d_name);
strcat(dst, "/X");
rename(ent->d_name, dst);
if (errno == EXDEV) {
[...]

Make “/tmp/user/controlled” a file with controlled content.

The kernel resolves that path for the first argument to rename() and sees the file.

Replace “/tmp/user/controlled” with a symlink to /etc/cron.

The kernel resolves the path again for the second argument and ends up in /etc/cron.

If both the tmp and cron directories are on the filesystem, the kernel will move the attacker controlled file to /etc/cron, leading to code execution as root.

We can’t tell if a call to open(/user/controlled, O_RDONLY) is a vulnerability without looking at the context. It depends on whether the contents are returned to the user or are used in some security sensitive way. A call to chmod(/user/controlled, mode) depending on the mode can be either a DoS or a privilege escalation. Accessing files in sticky directories (like /tmp) can become vulnerabilities if the attacker found an additional bug to delete arbitrary files.

How Pathauditor works

To find issues like this at scale we wrote PathAuditor, a tool that monitors file accesses and logs potential vulnerabilities. PathAuditor is a shared library that can be loaded into processes using LD_PRELOAD. It then hooks all filesystem related libc functions and checks if the access is safe. For that, we traverse the path and check if any component could be replaced by an unprivileged user, for example if a directory is user-writable. If we detect such a pattern, we log it to syslog for manual analysis.

Here's how you can use it to find vulnerabilities in your code:

LD_PRELOAD the library to your binary and then analyse its findings in syslog. You can also add the library to /etc/ld.so.preload, which will preload it in all binaries running on the system.
It will then gather the PID and the command line of the calling process, arguments of the vulnerable function, and a stack trace -- this provides a starting point for further investigation. At this point, you can use the stack trace to find the code path that triggered the violation and manually analyse what would happen if you would point the path to an arbitrary file or directory.
For example, if the code is opening a file and returning the content to the user then you could use it to read arbitrary files. If you control the path of chmod or chown, you might be able to change the permissions of chosen files and so on.

PathAuditor has proved successful at Google and we're excited to share it with the community. The project is still in the early stages and we are actively working on it. We look forward to hearing about any vulnerabilities you discover with the tool, and hope to see pull requests with further improvements.

Try out the PathAuditor tool here.

Marta Rożek was a Google Summer intern in 2019 and contributed to this blog and the PathAuditor tool

An Update on Android TLS Adoption

2019年12月3日

Posted by Bram Bonné, Senior Software Engineer, Android Platform Security & Chad Brubaker, Staff Software Engineer, Android Platform Security

banner illustration with several devices and gaming controller

Android is committed to keeping users, their devices, and their data safe. One of the ways that we keep data safe is by protecting network traffic that enters or leaves an Android device with Transport Layer Security (TLS). Android 7 (API level 24) introduced the Network Security Configuration in 2016, allowing app developers to configure the network security policy for their app through a declarative configuration file. To ensure apps are safe, apps targeting Android 9 (API level 28) or higher automatically have a policy set by default that prevents unencrypted traffic for every domain. Today, we’re happy to announce that 80% of Android apps are encrypting traffic by default. The percentage is even greater for apps targeting Android 9 and higher, with 90% of them encrypting traffic by default.

Percentage of apps that block cleartext by default. Since November 1 2019, all app (updates as well as all new apps on Google Play) must target at least Android 9. As a result, we expect these numbers to continue improving. Network traffic from these apps is secure by default and any use of unencrypted connections is the result of an explicit choice by the developer. The latest releases of Android Studio and Google Play’s pre-launch report warn developers when their app includes a potentially insecure Network Security Configuration (for example, when they allow unencrypted traffic for all domains or when they accept user provided certificates outside of debug mode). This encourages the adoption of HTTPS across the Android ecosystem and ensures that developers are aware of their security configuration.

Example of a warning shown to developers in Android Studio.

Example of a warning shown to developers as part of the pre-launch report. What can I do to secure my app? For apps targeting Android 9 and higher, the out-of-the-box default is to encrypt all network traffic in transit and trust only certificates issued by an authority in the standard Android CA set without requiring any extra configuration. Apps can provide an exception to this only by including a separate Network Security Config file with carefully selected exceptions. If your app needs to allow traffic to certain domains, it can do so by including a Network Security Config file that only includes these exceptions to the default secure policy. Keep in mind that you should be cautious about the data received over insecure connections as it could have been tampered with in transit. <network-security-config> <base-config cleartextTrafficPermitted="false" /> <domain-config cleartextTrafficPermitted="true"> <domain includeSubdomains="true">insecure.example.com</domain> <domain includeSubdomains="true">insecure.cdn.example.com</domain> </domain-config> </network-security-config> If your app needs to be able to accept user specified certificates for testing purposes (for example, connecting to a local server during testing), make sure to wrap your element inside a element. This ensures the connections in the production version of your app are secure. <network-security-config> <debug-overrides> <trust-anchors> <certificates src="user"/> </trust-anchors> </debug-overrides> </network-security-config>What can I do to secure my library? If your library directly creates secure/insecure connections, make sure that it honors the app's cleartext settings by checking isCleartextTrafficPermitted before opening any cleartext connection. Android’s built-in networking libraries and other popular HTTP libraries such as OkHttp or Volley have built-in Network Security Config support. Giles Hogben, Nwokedi Idika, Android Platform Security, Android Studio and Pre-Launch Report teams

Security Blog

Announcing updates to our Patch Rewards program in 2020

Protecting programmatic access to user data with Binary Authorization for Borg

Better password protections in Chrome - How it works

Detecting unsafe path access patterns with PathAuditor

An Update on Android TLS Adoption

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