Google Online Security Blog: 2021

Apache Log4j Vulnerability

17. prosinca 2021.

latest versionCVE-2021-44228CVE-2021-45046AndroidChrome OS Chrome BrowserGoogle Cloudspecific advisoryGoogle Marketing Platform,including Google Ads YouTube

Understanding the Impact of Apache Log4j Vulnerability

17. prosinca 2021.

Posted by James Wetter and Nicky Ringland, Open Source Insights Team

Editors Note:
The below numbers were calculated based on both log4j-core and log4j-api, as both were listed on the CVE. Since then, the CVE has been updated with the clarification that only log4j-core is affected.
The ecosystem impact numbers for just log4j-core, as of 19th December are over 17,000 packages affected, which is roughly 4% of the ecosystem. 25% of affected packages have fixed versions available.

The linked list, which continues to be updated, only includes packages which depend on log4j-core.Maven Central repository12

This vulnerability has captivated the information security ecosystem since its disclosure on December 9th because of both its severity and widespread impact. As a popular logging tool, log4j is used by tens of thousands of software packages (known as artifacts in the Java ecosystem) and projects across the software industry. User’s lack of visibility into their dependencies and transitive dependencies has made patching difficult; it has also made it difficult to determine the full blast radius of this vulnerability. Using Open Source Insights, a project to help understand open source dependencies, we surveyed all versions of all artifacts in the Maven Central Repository to determine the scope of the issue in the open source ecosystem of JVM based languages, and to track the ongoing efforts to mitigate the affected packages.

How widespread is the log4j vulnerability?

As of December 16, 2021, we found that 35,863 of the available Java artifacts from Maven Central depend on the affected log4j code. This means that more than 8% of all packages on Maven Central have at least one version that is impacted by this vulnerability. (These numbers do not encompass all Java packages, such as directly distributed binaries, but Maven Central is a strong proxy for the state of the ecosystem.)

As far as ecosystem impact goes, 8% is enormous. The average ecosystem impact of advisories affecting Maven Central is 2%, with the median less than 0.1%.

Direct dependencies account for around 7,000 of the affected artifacts, meaning that any of its versions depend upon an affected version of log4j-core or log4j-api, as described in the CVEs. The majority of affected artifacts come from indirect dependencies (that is, the dependencies of one’s own dependencies), meaning log4j is not explicitly defined as a dependency of the artifact, but gets pulled in as a transitive dependency.

What is the current progress in fixing the open source JVM ecosystem?
We counted an artifact as fixed if the artifact had at least one version affected and has released a greater stable version (according to semantic versioning) that is unaffected. An artifact affected by log4j is considered fixed if it has updated to 2.16.0 or removed its dependency on log4j altogether.

At the time of writing, nearly five thousand of the affected artifacts have been fixed. This represents a rapid response and mammoth effort both by the log4j maintainers and the wider community of open source consumers.

That leaves over 30,000 artifacts affected, many of which are dependent on another artifact to patch (the transitive dependency) and are likely blocked.

Why is fixing the JVM ecosystem hard?

Most artifacts that depend on log4j do so indirectly. The deeper the vulnerability is in a dependency chain, the more steps are required for it to be fixed. The following diagram shows a histogram of how deeply an affected log4j package (core or api) first appears in consumers dependency graphs. For greater than 80% of the packages, the vulnerability is more than one level deep, with a majority affected five levels down (and some as many as nine levels down). These packages will require fixes throughout all parts of the tree, starting from the deepest dependencies first.

Another difficulty is caused by ecosystem-level choices in the dependency resolution algorithm and requirement specification conventions.

In the Java ecosystem, it’s common practice to specify “soft” version requirements — exact versions that are used by the resolution algorithm if no other version of the same package appears earlier in the dependency graph. Propagating a fix often requires explicit action by the maintainers to update the dependency requirements to a patched version.

This practice is in contrast to other ecosystems, such as npm, where it’s common for developers to specify open ranges for dependency requirements. Open ranges allow the resolution algorithm to select the most recently released version that satisfies dependency requirements, thereby pulling in new fixes. Consumers can get a patched version on the next build after the patch is available, which propagates up the dependencies quickly. (This approach is not without its drawbacks; pulling in new fixes can also pull in new problems.)

How long will it take for this vulnerability to be fixed across the entire ecosystem?

It’s hard to say. We looked at all publicly disclosed critical advisories affecting Maven packages to get a sense of how quickly other vulnerabilities have been fully addressed. Less than half (48%) of the artifacts affected by a vulnerability have been fixed, so we might be in for a long wait, likely years.

But things are looking promising on the log4j front. After less than a week, 4,620 affected artifacts (~13%) have been fixed. This, more than any other stat, speaks to the massive effort by open source maintainers, information security teams and consumers across the globe.

Where to focus next?

Thanks and congratulations are due to the open source maintainers and consumers who have already upgraded their versions of log4j. As part of our investigation, we pulled together a list of 500 affected packages with some of the highest transitive usage. If you are a maintainer or user helping with the patching effort, prioritizing these packages could maximize your impact and unblock more of the community.

We encourage the open source community to continue to strengthen security in these packages by enabling automated dependency updates and adding security mitigations. Improvements such as these could qualify for financial rewards from the Secure Open Source Rewards program.

You can explore your package dependencies and their vulnerabilities by using Open Source Insights.

Improving OSS-Fuzz and Jazzer to catch Log4Shell

16. prosinca 2021.

Posted by Jonathan Metzman, Google Open Source Security Team
The discovery of the Log4Shell vulnerability has set the internet on fire. Similar to shellshock and heartbleed, Log4Shell is just the latest catastrophic vulnerability in software that runs the internet. Our mission as the Google Open Source Security Team is to secure the open source libraries the world depends on, such as Log4j. One of our capabilities in this space is OSS-Fuzz, a free fuzzing service that is used by over 500 critical open source projects and has found more than 7,000 vulnerabilities in its lifetime.

We want to empower open source developers to secure their code on their own. Over the next year we will work on better automated detection of non-memory corruption vulnerabilities such as Log4Shell. We have started this work by partnering with the security company Code Intelligence to provide continuous fuzzing for Log4j, as part of OSS-Fuzz. Also as part of this partnership, Code-Intelligence improved their Jazzer fuzzing engine to make it capable of detecting remote JNDI lookups. We have awarded Code Intelligence $25,000 for this effort and will continue to work with them on securing the open source ecosystem.

Caption: OSS-Fuzz and Jazzer finding the Log4Shell Vulnerability

Vulnerabilities like Log4Shell are an eye-opener for the industry in terms of new attack vectors. With OSS-Fuzz and Jazzer, we can now detect this class of vulnerability so that they can be fixed before they become a problem in production code.

Over the past year we have made a number of investments to strengthen the security of critical open source projects, and recently announced our $10 billion commitment to cybersecurity defense including $100 million to support third-party foundations that manage open source security priorities and help fix vulnerabilities.

We appreciate the maintainers, security engineers and incident responders that are working to mitigate Log4j and make our internet ecosystem safer.

Check out our documentation to get started using OSS-Fuzz.

Empowering the next generation of Android Application Security Researchers

14. prosinca 2021.

Posted by Jon Bottarini, Security Program Manager & Lena Katib, Strategic Partnerships Manager

The external security researcher community plays an integral role in making the Google Play ecosystem safe and secure. Through this partnership with the community, Google has been able to collaborate with third-party developers to fix thousands of security issues in Android applications before they are exploited and reward security researchers for their hard work and dedication. In order to empower the next generation of Android security researchers, Google has collaborated with industry partners including HackerOne and PayPal to host a number of Android App Hacking Workshops. These workshops are an effort designed to educate security researchers and cybersecurity students of all skill levels on how to find Android application vulnerabilities through a series of hands-on working sessions, both in-person and virtual. Through these workshops, we’ve seen attendees from groups such as Merritt College's cybersecurity program and alumni of Hack the Hood go on to report real-world security vulnerabilities to the Google Play Security Rewards program. This reward program is designed to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in apps on Google Play, and keep Android users, developers and the Google Play ecosystem safe. Today, we are releasing our slide deck and workshop materials, including source code for a custom-built Android application that allows you to test your Android application security skills in a variety of capture the flag style challenges. These materials cover a wide range of techniques for finding vulnerabilities in Android applications. Whether you’re just getting started or have already found many bugs - chances are you’ll learn something new from these challenges! If you get stuck and need a hint on solving a challenge, the solutions for each are available in the Android App Hacking Workshop here. As you work through the challenges and learn more about the techniques and tips described in our workshop materials, we’d love to hear your feedback. Additional Resources:

If you want to learn more about how to prepare, launch, and run a Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP) or discover how to work with external security researchers, check out our VDP course here.

If you’re a developer looking to build more secure applications, check out Android app security best practices here.

Exploring Container Security: A Storage Vulnerability Deep Dive

2. prosinca 2021.

Posted by Fabricio Voznika and Mauricio Poppe, Google Cloud high severity vulnerabilityvulnerability management in open-source Kubernetesthe Kubernetes Security Response CommitteeKubernetes Filesystems: Intro to Volume SubpathCVE-2021-25741, inside a container, andvolume subpathA previous fixtime of check to time of use (TOCTOU)A New TOCTOU Vulnerability: CVE-2021-25741renameat(2)The expectation and the attack outcomemount(8)The fix is in
Once the problem was well understood, we fixed it inside Kubernetes and quickly released the fix to GKE and Anthos. If GKE auto-upgrade is enabled in your clusters there's no action on your part for this vulnerability, your nodes have already been patched. We strongly recommend that customers utilize auto-upgrades. Auto-upgrade gives peace of mind that your clusters are running with the latest patches.

GKE released a Google Kubernetes Engine security bulletin on this vulnerability, which detailed what customers can do to immediately remediate this issue across GKE and Anthos. We also provided guidance to customers who manually manage their node versions, ensuring that fixed releases were available in every region for our Static and Release Channels.

Moving forward
Google continues to invest heavily in the security of GKE and Kubernetes. We encourage users interested in finding vulnerabilities to participate in the Kubernetes bug bounty program and in the Google Vulnerability Rewards Program (VRP) which was recently expanded to cover GKE vulnerabilities. For the latest guidance on security issues, please follow our GKE Security Bulletins.

ClusterFuzzLite: Continuous fuzzing for all

11. studenoga 2021.

Posted by Jonathan Metzman, Google Open Source Security Team

In recent years, continuous fuzzing has become an essential part of the software development lifecycle. By feeding unexpected or random data into a program, fuzzing catches bugs that would otherwise slip through the most thorough manual checks and provides coverage that would take staggering human effort to replicate. NIST’s guidelines for software verification, recently released in response to the White House Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity, specify fuzzing among the minimum standard requirements for code verification.

Today, we are excited to announce ClusterFuzzLite, a continuous fuzzing solution that runs as part of CI/CD workflows to find vulnerabilities faster than ever before. With just a few lines of code, GitHub users can integrate ClusterFuzzLite into their workflow and fuzz pull requests to catch bugs before they are committed, enhancing the overall security of the software supply chain.

Since its release in 2016, over 500 critical open source projects have integrated into Google’s OSS-Fuzz program, resulting in over 6,500 vulnerabilities and 21,000 functional bugs being fixed. ClusterFuzzLite goes hand-in-hand with OSS-Fuzz, by catching regression bugs much earlier in the development process.

Large projects including systemd and curl are already using ClusterFuzzLite during code review, with positive results. According to Daniel Stenberg, author of curl, “When the human reviewers nod and have approved the code and your static code analyzers and linters can't detect any more issues, fuzzing is what takes you to the next level of code maturity and robustness. OSS-Fuzz and ClusterFuzzLite help us maintain curl as a quality project, around the clock, every day and every commit.”

With the release of ClusterFuzzLite, any project can integrate this essential testing standard and benefit from fuzzing. ClusterFuzzLite offers many of the same features as ClusterFuzz, such as continuous fuzzing, sanitizer support, corpus management, and coverage report generation. Most importantly, it’s easy to set up and works with closed source projects, making ClusterFuzzLite a convenient option for any developer who wants to fuzz their software.

With ClusterFuzzLite, fuzzing is no longer just an idealized "bonus" round of testing for those who have access to it, but a critical must-have step that everyone can use continuously on every software project. By finding and preventing bugs before they enter the codebase we can build a more secure software ecosystem.

To learn more, check out the ClusterFuzzLite documentation. ClusterFuzzLite currently supports GitHub Actions, Google Cloud Build and Prow. We built this with CI system extensibility in mind, and adding support for other CI systems is straightforward. Please contact us if you’re interested in contributing support, or have any questions, feedback or feature requests.

Trick & Treat! 🎃 Paying Leets and Sweets for Linux Kernel privescs and k8s escapes

1. studenoga 2021.

Posted by Eduardo Vela, Google Bug Hunters Team
Kubernetesresearch its vulnerabilities and attacksstudy and develop its defenseskCTF VRP

If the vulnerability was otherwise unpatched in the Kernel (0day)

If the exploit uses a new attack or technique, as determined by Google

Container-Optimized OS250,000 USD

Connect to the kCTF VRP cluster, obtain root and read the flag (read this writeup for how it was done before, and this threat model for inspiration), and then submit your flag and a checksum of your exploit in this form.

(If applicable) report vulnerabilities to upstream.

We strongly recommend including a patch since that could qualify for an additional reward from our Patch Reward Program, but please report vulnerabilities upstream promptly once you confirm they are exploitable.

Report your finding to Google VRP once all patches are publicly available (we don't want to receive details of unpatched vulnerabilities ahead of the public.)

Provide the exploit code and the algorithm used to calculate the hash checksum.
A rough description of the exploit strategy is welcome.

#kctfhere

Protecting your device information with Private Set Membership

28. listopada 2021.

Posted by Kevin Yeo and Sarvar Patel, Private Computing Team
At Google, keeping you safe online is our top priority, so we continuously build the most advanced privacy-preserving technologies into our products. Over the past few years, we've utilized innovations in cryptographic research to keep your personal information private by design and secure by default. As part of this, we launched Password Checkup, which protects account credentials by notifying you if an entered username and password are known to have been compromised in a prior data breach. Using cryptographic techniques, Password Checkup can do this without revealing your credentials to anyone, including Google. Today, Password Checkup protects users across many platforms including Android, Chrome and Google Password Manager.

Another example is Private Join and Compute, an open source protocol which enables organizations to work together and draw insights from confidential data sets. Two parties are able to encrypt their data sets, join them, and compute statistics over the joint data. By leveraging secure multi-party computation, Private Join and Compute is designed to ensure that the plaintext data sets are concealed from all parties.

In this post, we introduce the next iteration of our research, Private Set Membership, as well as its open-source availability. At a high level, Private Set Membership considers the scenario in which Google holds a database of items, and user devices need to contact Google to check whether a specific item is found in the database. As an example, users may want to check membership of a computer program on a block list consisting of known malicious software before executing the program. Often, the set’s contents and the queried items are sensitive, so we designed Private Set Membership to perform this task while preserving the privacy of our users.

Protecting your device information during enrollment
Beginning in Chrome 94, Private Set Membership will enable Chrome OS devices to complete the enrollment process in a privacy-preserving manner. Device enrollment is an integral part of the out-of-box experience that welcomes you when getting started with a Chrome OS device.

The device enrollment process requires checking membership of device information in encrypted Google databases, including checking if a device is enterprise enrolled or determining if a device was pre-packaged with a license. The correct end state of your Chrome OS device is determined using the results of these membership checks.

During the enrollment process, we protect your Chrome OS devices by ensuring no information ever leaves the device that may be decrypted by anyone else when using Private Set Membership. Google will never learn any device information and devices will not learn any unnecessary information about other devices. To our knowledge, this is the first instance of advanced cryptographic tools being leveraged to protect device information during the enrollment process.

A deeper look at Private Set Membership
Private Set Membership is built upon two cryptographic tools:

Homomorphic encryption is a powerful cryptographic tool that enables computation over encrypted data without the need for decryption. As an example, given the encryptions of values X and Y, homomorphic encryption enables computing the encryption of the sum of X and Y without ever needing to decrypt. This preserves privacy as the data remains concealed during the computation. Private Set Membership is built upon Google’s open source homomorphic encryption library.
Oblivious hashing is a cryptographic technique that enables two parties to jointly compute a hash, H(K, x), where the sender holds the key, K, and the receiver holds the hash input, x. The receiver will obtain the hash, H(K, x), without learning the key K. At the same time, the input x will be hidden from the sender.

Take a look at how Private Set Membership utilizes homomorphic encryption and oblivious hashing to protect data below:

For a deeper look into the technology behind Private Set Membership, you can also access our open source code.

Privacy properties
By using Private Set Membership, the following privacy properties are obtained:

No data leaves the device when checking membership. We designed Private Set Membership using advanced cryptographic techniques to ensure that data never leaves the device in an unencrypted manner when performing membership checks. As a result, the data on your device will be concealed from everyone, including Google.
Devices learn only membership information and nothing else. Private Set Membership was designed to prevent devices from learning any unnecessary information about other devices when querying. For each query, devices learn only the results of the membership check and no other information.

Using Private Set Membership to solve more problems
Private Set Membership is a powerful tool that solves a fundamental problem in a privacy-preserving manner. This is just the beginning of what’s possible using this technology. Private Set Membership can help preserve user privacy across a wide array of applications. For example:

Checking allow or block lists. In this setting, users check membership in an allow or block list to determine whether to proceed with the desired action. Private Set Membership enables this check without any information about the software leaving the device.
Control flows with conditional membership checks. Control flows are a common computer science concept that represent arbitrary computer programs with conditional branching. In many cases, the conditional branches require checking membership of sensitive data to determine the next step of the algorithm. By utilizing Private Set Membership, we enable execution of these algorithms while ensuring data never leaves the user’s device.

We still have a ways to go before Private Set Membership is used for general membership checks by devices. At Google, we are exploring a number of potential use cases to protect your privacy using Private Set Membership. We are excited to continue advancing the state-of-the-art cryptographic research to keep you safe.

Acknowledgements

The work in this post is the result of a collaboration between a large group of current and former Google engineers, research scientists and others including: Amr Aboelkher, Asra Ali, Ghous Amjad, Yves Arrouye, Roland Bock, Xi Chen, Maksim Ivanov, Dennis Kalinichenko, Nirdhar Khazanie, Dawon Lee, Tancrède Lepoint, Lawrence Lui, Pavol Marko, Thiemo Nagel, Mariana Raykova, Aaron Segal, Joon Young Seo, Karn Seth, and Jason Wong.

Pixel 6: Setting a new standard for mobile security

27. listopada 2021.

Posted by Dave Kleidermacher, Jesse Seed, Brandon Barbello, and Stephan Somogyi, Android, Pixel & Tensor security teams With Pixel 6 and Pixel 6 Pro, we’re launching our most secure Pixel phone yet, with 5 years of security updates and the most layers of hardware security. These new Pixel smartphones take a layered security approach, with innovations spanning across the Google Tensor system on a chip (SoC) hardware to new Pixel-first features in the Android operating system, making it the first Pixel phone with Google security from the silicon all the way to the data center. Multiple dedicated security teams have also worked to ensure that Pixel’s security is provable through transparency and external validation. Secure to the Core Google has put user data protection and transparency at the forefront of hardware security with Google Tensor. Google Tensor’s main processors are Arm-based and utilize TrustZone™ technology. TrustZone is a key part of our security architecture for general secure processing, but the security improvements included in Google Tensor go beyond TrustZone.

Figure 1. Pixel Secure EnvironmentsThe Google Tensor security core is a custom designed security subsystem dedicated to the preservation of user privacy. It's distinct from the application processor, not only logically, but physically, and consists of a dedicated CPU, ROM, one-time-programmable (OTP) memory, crypto engine, internal SRAM, and protected DRAM. For Pixel 6 and 6 Pro, the security core’s primary use cases include protecting user data keys at runtime, hardening secure boot, and interfacing with Titan M2^TM. Your secure hardware is only as good as your secure OS, and we are using Trusty, our open source trusted execution environment. Trusty OS is the secure OS used both in TrustZone and the Google Tensor security core. With Pixel 6 and Pixel 6 Pro your security is enhanced by the new Titan M2^TM, our discrete security chip, fully designed and developed by Google. In this next generation chip, we moved to an in-house designed RISC-V processor, with extra speed and memory, and made it even more resilient to advanced attacks. Titan M2^TM has been tested against the most rigorous standard for vulnerability assessment, AVA_VAN.5, by an independent, accredited evaluation lab. Titan M2™ supports Android Strongbox, which securely generates and stores keys used to protect your PINs and password, and works hand-in-hand with Google Tensor security core to protect user data keys while in use in the SoC. Moving a step higher in the system, Pixel 6 and Pixel 6 Pro ship with Android 12 and a slew of Pixel-first and Pixel-exclusive features. Enhanced Controls We aim to give users better ways to control their data and manage their devices with every release of Android. Starting with Android 12 on Pixel, you can use the new Security hub to manage all your security settings in one place. It helps protect your phone, apps, Google Account, and passwords by giving you a central view of your device’s current configuration. Security hub also provides recommendations to improve your security, helping you decide what settings best meet your needs.

For privacy, we are launching Privacy Dashboard, which will give you a simple and clear timeline view of the apps that have accessed your location, microphone and camera in the last 24 hours. If you notice apps that are accessing more data than you expected, the dashboard provides a path to controls to change those permissions on the fly.

To provide additional transparency, new indicators in Pixel’s status bar will show you when your camera and mic are being accessed by apps. If you want to disable that access, new privacy toggles give you the ability to turn off camera or microphone access across apps on your phone with a single tap, at any time.

The Pixel 6 and Pixel 6 Pro also include a toggle that lets you remove your device’s ability to connect to less-secure 2G networks. While necessary in certain situations, accessing 2G networks can open up additional attack vectors; this toggle helps users mitigate those risks when 2G connectivity isn’t needed. Built-in security By making all of our products secure by default, Google keeps more people safe online than anyone else in the world. With the Pixel 6 and Pixel 6 Pro, we’re also ratcheting up the dial on default, built-in protections. Our new optical under-display fingerprint sensor ensures that your biometric information is secure and never leaves your device. As part of our ongoing security development lifecycle, Pixel 6 and 6 Pro’s fingerprint unlock has been externally validated by security experts as a strong and secure biometric unlock mechanism meeting the Class 3 strength requirements defined in the Android 12 Compatibility Definition Document (CDD). Phishing continues to be a huge attack vector, affecting everyone across different devices. The Pixel 6 and Pixel 6 Pro introduce new anti-phishing protections. Built-in protections automatically scan for potential threats from phone calls, text messages, emails, and links sent through apps, notifying you if there’s a potential problem. Users are also now better protected against bad apps by enhancements to our on-device detection capabilities within Google Play Protect. Since its launch in 2017, Google Play Protect has provided the ability to detect malicious applications even when the device is offline. The Pixel 6 and Pixel 6 Pro uses new machine learning models that improve the detection of malware in Google Play Protect. The detection runs on your Pixel, and uses a privacy preserving technology called federated analytics to discover commonly-run bad apps. This will help to further protect over 3 billion users by improving Google Play Protect, which already analyzes over 100 billion apps every day to detect threats. Many of Pixel’s privacy-preserving features run inside Private Compute Core, an open source sandbox isolated from the rest of the operating system and apps. Our open source Private Compute Services manages network communication for these features, and uses federated learning, federated analytics, and private information retrieval to improve features while preserving privacy. Some features already running on Private Compute Core include Live Caption, Now Playing, and Smart Reply suggestions. Google Binary Transparency (GBT) is the newest addition to our open and verifiable security infrastructure, providing a new layer of software integrity for your device. Building on the principles pioneered by Certificate Transparency, GBT helps ensure your Pixel is only running verified OS software. It works by using append-only logs to store signed hashes of the system images. The logs are public and can be used to verify that what’s published is the same as what’s on the device – giving users and researchers the ability to independently verify OS integrity for the first time. Beyond the Phone Defense-in-depth isn’t just a matter of hardware and software layers. Security is a rigorous process. Pixel 6 and Pixel 6 Pro benefit from in-depth design and architecture reviews, memory-safe rewrites to security critical code, static analysis, formal verification of source code, fuzzing of critical components, and red-teaming, including with external security labs to pen-test our devices. Pixel is also part of the Android Vulnerability Rewards Program, which paid out $1.75 million last year, creating a valuable feedback loop between us and the security research community and, most importantly, helping us keep our users safe. Capping off this combined hardware and software security system, is the Titan Backup Architecture, which gives your Pixel a secure foot in the cloud. Launched in 2018, the combination of Android’s Backup Service and Google Cloud’s Titan Technology means that backed-up application data can only be decrypted by a randomly generated key that isn't known to anyone besides the client, including Google. This end-to-end service was independently audited by a third party security lab to ensure no one can access a user's backed-up application data without specifically knowing their passcode. To top it all off, this end-to-end security from the hardware across the software to the data center comes with no fewer than 5 years of guaranteed Android security updates on Pixel 6 and Pixel 6 Pro devices from the date they launch in the US. This is an important commitment for the industry, and we hope that other smartphone manufacturers broaden this trend. Together, our secure chipset, software and processes make Pixel 6 and Pixel 6 Pro the most secure Pixel phone yet.

Launching a collaborative minimum security baseline

27. listopada 2021.

Posted by Royal Hansen, Vice President, Security
Opus and Ponemon Institute studyMinimum Viable Secure Product
How can MVSP help you?

Security teams measuring vendor offerings against a set of minimum security baselines

Internal teams looking to measure your security against minimum requirements
Procurement teams gathering information about vendor servicesLegal teams negotiating contractual controls
Compliance teams documenting processes
community feedbackAcknowledgementsThe work in this post is the result of a collaboration between a large number of security practitioners across the industry including: Marat Vyshegorodtsev, Chris John Riley, Gabor Acs-Kurucz, Sebastian Oglaza, Gen Buckley, and Kevin Clark.

Google Protects Your Accounts – Even When You No Longer Use Them

5. listopada 2021.

Posted by Sam Heft-Luthy, Product Manager, Privacy & Data Protection Office Colonial PipelineT-Mobile breach Inactive Account ManagerHere’s How it Workssign up

When the account should be considered inactive: You can choose 3, 6, 12 or 18 months of inactivity before Google takes action on your account. Google will notify you a month before the designated time via a message sent to your phone and an email sent to the address you provide.

Who to notify and what to share: You can choose up to 10 people for Google to notify once your Google Account becomes inactive (they won’t be notified during setup). You can also give them access to some of your data. If you choose to share data with your trusted contacts, the email will include a list of the selected data you wanted to share with them, and a link they can follow to download that data. This can include things like photos, contacts, emails, documents and other data that you specifically choose to share with your trusted contact. You can also choose to set up a Gmail AutoReply, with a custom subject and message explaining that you’ve ceased using the account.

If your inactive Google Account should be deleted: After your account becomes inactive, Google can delete all its content or send it to your designated contacts. If you’ve decided to allow someone to download your content, they’ll be able to do so for 3 months before it gets deleted. If you choose to delete your Google Account, this will include your publicly shared data (for example, your YouTube videos, or blogs on Blogger). You can review the data associated with your account on the Google Dashboard. If you use Gmail with your account, you'll no longer be able to access that email once your account becomes inactive. You'll also be unable to reuse that Gmail username.

Privacy Checkuptop five safety tipsSafety Center

Introducing the Secure Open Source Pilot Program

1. listopada 2021.

Posted by Meder Kydyraliev and Kim Lewandowski, Google Open Source Security Team
Over the past year we have made a number of investments to strengthen the security of critical open source projects, and recently announced our $10 billion commitment to cybersecurity defense including $100 million to support third-party foundations that manage open source security priorities and help fix vulnerabilities.

Today, we are excited to announce our sponsorship for the Secure Open Source (SOS) pilot program run by the Linux Foundation. This program financially rewards developers for enhancing the security of critical open source projects that we all depend on. We are starting with a $1 million investment and plan to expand the scope of the program based on community feedback.

Why SOS?
SOS rewards a very broad range of improvements that proactively harden critical open source projects and supporting infrastructure against application and supply chain attacks. To complement existing programs that reward vulnerability management, SOS’s scope is comparatively wider in the type of work it rewards, in order to support project developers.

What projects are in scope?
Since there is no one definition of what makes an open source project critical, our selection process will be holistic. During submission evaluation we will consider the guidelines established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s definition in response to the recent Executive Order on Cybersecurity along with criteria listed below:

The impact of the project:

How many and what types of users will be affected by the security improvements?
Will the improvements have a significant impact on infrastructure and user security?
If the project were compromised, how serious or wide-reaching would the implications be?

The project’s rankings in existing open source criticality research:

Is the project included in the Havard 2 Census Study of most-used packages, or does it have a score of 0.6 or above in the OpenSSF Critically Score project?

What security improvements qualify?
The program is initially focused on rewarding the following work:

Software supply chain security improvements including hardening CI/CD pipelines and distribution infrastructure. The SLSA framework suggests specific requirements to consider, such as basic provenance generation and verification.
Adoption of software artifact signing and verification. One option to consider is Sigstore's set of utilities (e.g. cosign).
Project improvements that produce higher OpenSSF Scorecard results. For example, a contributor can follow remediation suggestions for the following Scorecard checks:

Code-Review
Branch-Protection
Pinned-Dependencies
Dependency-Update-Tool
Fuzzing

Use of OpenSSF Allstar and remediation of discovered issues.
Earning a CII Best Practice Badge (which also improves the Scorecard results).

We'll continue adding to the above list, so check our FAQ for updates. You may also submit improvements not listed above, if you provide justification and evidence to help us understand the complexity and impact of the work.

Only work completed after October 1, 2021 qualifies for SOS rewards.

Upfront funding is available on a limited case by case basis for impactful improvements of moderate to high complexity over a longer time span. Such requests should explain why funding is required upfront and provide a detailed plan of how the improvements will be landed.
How to participate
Review our FAQ and fill out this form to submit your application.

Please include as much data or supporting evidence as possible to help us evaluate the significance of the project and your improvements.

Reward amounts
Reward amounts are determined based on complexity and impact of work:

$10,000 or more for complicated, high-impact and lasting improvements that almost certainly prevent major vulnerabilities in the affected code or supporting infrastructure.
$5,000-$10,000 for moderately complex improvements that offer compelling security benefits.
$1,000-$5,000 for submissions of modest complexity and impact.
$505 for small improvements that nevertheless have merit from a security standpoint.

Looking Ahead
The SOS program is part of a broader effort to address a growing truth: the world relies on open source software, but widespread support and financial contributions are necessary to keep that software safe and secure. This $1 million investment is just the beginning—we envision the SOS pilot program as the starting point for future efforts that will hopefully bring together other large organizations and turn it into a sustainable, long-term initiative under the OpenSSF. We welcome community feedback and interest from others who want to contribute to the SOS program. Together we can pool our support to give back to the open source community that makes the modern internet possible.

Announcing New Patch Reward Program for Tsunami Security Scanner

28. rujna 2021.

Posted by Guoli Ma, Sebastian Lekies & Claudio Criscione, Google Vulnerability Management Team
publishedTsunami security scannerBug Hunters

Vulnerability detection plugins: In order to expand Tsunami scanner's detection capabilities, we encourage everyone who is interested in making contributions to this project to add new vulnerabilities detection plugins. All plugin contributions will be reviewed by our panel members in Google's Vulnerability Management team and the reward amount will be determined by the severity as well as the time sensitivity of the vulnerability.

Web application fingerprints: Several months ago, we added new web application fingerprinting capabilities to Tsunami that detect popular off-the-shelf web applications. It achieves this goal by matching application fingerprints against a database of known web application fingerprints. More fingerprint data is needed for this approach to support more web applications. You will be rewarded with a flat amount for each application added to the database.

official rules and guidelinestsunami-patch-rewards@google.com

Distroless Builds Are Now SLSA 2

22. rujna 2021.

Posted by Priya Wadhwa and Appu Goundan, Google Open Source Security Team
signing all distroless images with cosignSLSA 2security framework

SLSA 2 Requirement	Distroless
Source - Version controlled	Source code in Github
Build - Scripted build	Build script exists as a Tekton Pipeline, invoked as a Google Cloud Build step
Build - Build service	All steps run on Kubernetes with Tekton
Provenance - Available	Provenance is available in the rekor transparency log as an in-toto attestation
Provenance - Authenticated	Provenance is signed with the distroless GCP KMS key
Provenance - Service generated	Provenance is generated by Tekton Chains from a Tekton TaskRun

Achieving SLSA 2 required some changes to the distroless build pipeline: we set up Tekton Pipelines and Tekton Chains in a GKE cluster to automate building images and generating provenance. Every time a pull request is merged to the distroless Github repo, a Tekton Pipeline is triggered. This Pipeline builds the distroless images, and Tekton Chains is responsible for generating signed provenance for each image. Tekton Chains stores the signed provenance alongside the image in an OCI registry and also stores a record of the provenance in the rekor transparency log.

Don't trust us?

You can try the build yourself. Because distroless builds are reproducible, all the information to replicate the build is in the provenance, and you or a trusted third party can build the image yourselves and verify the build is correct by matching image digests.

You can verify an attestation for a distroless image with cosign and the distroless public key:

$ cosign verify-attestation -key cosign.pub gcr.io/distroless/base@sha256:4f8aa0aba190e375a5a53bb71a303c89d9734c817714aeaca9bb23b82135ed91

Verification for gcr.io/distroless/base@sha256:4f8aa0aba190e375a5a53bb71a303c89d9734c817714aeaca9bb23b82135ed91 --

The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:

- The cosign claims were validated

- The signatures were verified against the specified public key

- Any certificates were verified against the Fulcio roots.

...

And you can find the provenance for the image in the rekor transparency log with the rekor-cli tool. For example, you could find the provenance for the above image by using the image’s digest and running:

$ rekor-cli search --sha sha256:4f8aa0aba190e375a5a53bb71a303c89d9734c817714aeaca9bb23b82135ed91

af7a9687d263504ccdb2759169c9903d8760775045c6e7554e365ec2bf29f6f8

$ rekor-cli get --uuid af7a9687d263504ccdb2759169c9903d8760775045c6e7554e365ec2bf29f6f8 --format json | jq -r .Attestation | base64 --decode | jq

{

"_type": "distroless-provenance",

"predicateType": "https://tekton.dev/chains/provenance",

"subject": [

{

"name": "gcr.io/distroless/base",

"digest": {

"sha256": "703a4726aedc9ec7a7e32251087565246db117bb9a141a7993d1c4bb4036660d"

}

{

"name": "gcr.io/distroless/base",

"digest": {

"sha256": "d322ed16d530596c37eee3eb57a039677502aa71f0e4739b0272b1ebd8be9bce"

}

{

"name": "gcr.io/distroless/base",

"digest": {

"sha256": "2dfdd5bf591d0da3f67a25f3fc96d929b256d5be3e0af084db10952e5da2c661"

}

{

"name": "gcr.io/distroless/base",

"digest": {

"sha256": "4f8aa0aba190e375a5a53bb71a303c89d9734c817714aeaca9bb23b82135ed91"

}

{

"name": "gcr.io/distroless/base",

"digest": {

"sha256": "dc0a793d83196a239abf3ba035b3d1a0c7a24184856c2649666e84bc82fc5980"

}

{