Security Blog
The latest news and insights from Google on security and safety on the Internet
An update on attempted man-in-the-middle attacks
August 29, 2011
Posted by Heather Adkins, Information Security Manager
Today we received reports of attempted SSL man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks against Google users, whereby someone tried to get between them and encrypted Google services. The people affected were primarily located in Iran. The attacker used a fraudulent SSL certificate issued by DigiNotar, a root certificate authority that should not issue certificates for Google (and has since revoked it).
Google Chrome users were protected from this attack because Chrome was able to
detect
the fraudulent certificate.
To further protect the safety and privacy of our users, we plan to disable the DigiNotar certificate authority in Chrome while investigations continue. Mozilla also
moved quickly
to protect its users. This means that Chrome and Firefox users will receive alerts if they try to visit websites that use DigiNotar certificates. Microsoft also has
taken prompt action
.
To help deter unwanted surveillance, we recommend that users, especially those in Iran, keep their web browsers and operating systems up to date and pay attention to web browser security warnings.
Update
Aug 30:
Added information about Microsoft's response.
Update
Sept 3:
Our top priority is to protect the privacy and security of our users. Based on the findings and decision of the Dutch government, as well as conversations with other browser makers, we have decided to reject all of the Certificate Authorities operated by DigiNotar. We encourage DigiNotar to provide a complete analysis of the situation.
Four Years of Web Malware
August 17, 2011
Posted by Lucas Ballard and Niels Provos, Google Security Team
Google’s Safe Browsing initiative has been protecting users from web pages that install malware for over five years now. Each day we show around 3 million malware warnings to over four hundred million users whose browsers implement the Safe Browsing API. Like other service providers, we are engaged in an arms race with malware distributors. Over time, we have adapted our original system to incorporate new detection algorithms that allow us to keep pace. We recently completed an analysis of four years of data that explores the evasive techniques that malware distributors employ. We compiled the results in a technical report, entitled “
Trends in Circumventing Web-Malware Detection
.”
Below are a few of the research highlights, but we recommend reviewing the
full report
for details on our methodology and measurements. The analysis covers approximately 160 million web pages hosted on approximately 8 million sites.
Social Engineering
Social engineering is a malware distribution mechanism that relies on tricking a user into installing malware. Typically, the malware is disguised as an anti-virus product or browser plugin. Social engineering has increased in frequency significantly and is still rising. However, it’s important to keep this growth in perspective — sites that rely on social engineering comprise only 2% of all sites that distribute malware.
Number of sites distributing Social Engineering Malware and Exploits over time
Drive-by Download Exploit Trends
Far more common than social engineering, malicious pages install malware after exploiting a vulnerability in the browser or a plugin. This type of infection is often called a drive-by download. Our analysis of which vulnerabilities are actively being exploited over time shows that adversaries quickly switch to new and more reliable exploits to help avoid detection. The graph below shows the ratio of exploits targeting a vulnerability in one CVE to all exploits over time. Most vulnerabilities are exploited only for a short period of time until new vulnerabilities become available. A prominent exception is the MDAC vulnerability which is present in most exploit kits.
Prevalence of exploits targeting specific CVEs over time
Increase in IP Cloaking
Malware distributors are increasingly relying upon ‘cloaking’ as a technique to evade detection. The concept behind cloaking is simple: serve benign content to detection systems, but serve malicious content to normal web page visitors. Over the years, we have seen more malicious sites engaging in IP cloaking. To bypass the cloaking defense, we run our scanners in different ways to mimic regular user traffic.
Number of sites practicing IP Cloaking over time
New Detection Capabilities
Our report analyzed four years of data to uncover trends in malware distribution on the web, and it demonstrates the ongoing tension between malware distributors and malware detectors. To help protect Internet users, even those who don’t use Google, we have updated the Safe Browsing infrastructure over the years to incorporate many state-of-the-art malware detection technologies. We hope the findings outlined in this report will help other researchers in this area and raise awareness of some of the current challenges.
Fuzzing at scale
August 12, 2011
Posted by Chris Evans, Matt Moore and Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team
One of the exciting things about working on security at Google is that you have a lot of compute horsepower available if you need it. This is very useful if you’re looking to
fuzz
something, and especially if you’re going to use modern fuzzing techniques.
Using these techniques and large amounts of compute power, we’ve found hundreds of bugs in our own code, including Chrome components such as WebKit and the PDF viewer. We recently decided to apply the same techniques to fuzz Adobe’s Flash Player, which we include with Chrome in partnership with Adobe.
A good overview of some modern techniques can be read
in this presentation
. For the purposes of fuzzing Flash, we mainly relied on “corpus distillation”. This is a technique whereby you locate a large number of sample files for the format at hand (SWF in this case). You then see which areas of code are reached by each of the sample files. Finally, you run an algorithm to generate a minimal set of sample files that achieves the code coverage of the full set. This calculated set of files is a great basis for fuzzing: a manageable number of files that exercise lots of unusual code paths.
What does corpus distillation look like at Google scale? Turns out we have a large index of the web, so we cranked through 20 terabytes of SWF file downloads followed by 1 week of run time on 2,000 CPU cores to calculate the minimal set of about 20,000 files. Finally, those same 2,000 cores plus 3 more weeks of runtime were put to good work mutating the files in the minimal set (bitflipping, etc.) and generating crash cases. These crash cases included an interesting range of vulnerability categories, including buffer overflows, integer overflows, use-after-frees and object type confusions.
The initial run of the ongoing effort resulted in about 400 unique crash signatures, which were logged as 106 individual security bugs following Adobe's initial triage. As these bugs were resolved, many were identified as duplicates that weren't caught during the initial triage. A unique crash signature does not always indicate a unique bug. Since Adobe has access to symbols and sources, they were able to group similar crashes to perform root cause analysis reducing the actual number of changes to the code. No analysis was performed to determine how many of the identified crashes were actually exploitable. However, each crash was treated as though it were potentially exploitable and addressed by Adobe. In the final analysis, the Flash Player update Adobe shipped earlier this week contained about 80 code changes to fix these bugs.
Commandeering massive resource to improve security is rewarding on its own, but the real highlight of this exercise has been Adobe’s response. The
Flash patch
earlier this week fixes these bugs and incorporates UIPI protections for the Flash Player sandbox in Chrome which Justin Schuh contributed assistance on developing. Fixing
so many issues
in such a short time frame shows a real commitment to security from Adobe, for which we are grateful.
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