Security Blog

The latest news and insights from Google on security and safety on the Internet

Changes to our SSL Certificates

23 de maio de 2013
Share on Twitter Share on Facebook
Google

10 comentários :

Chris Lockfort disse...

With an apparent move to having a wide variety of CA vendors / leaf certs / etc, won't that make it harder for people to recognize when, for instance, a government forces a CA to issue valid certs for domains like gmail.com and intercepts what they presumed were private communications?

24 de maio de 2013 às 10:37
Unknown disse...

... and certainly you should use sha-256 instead of sha-1 in your certificates

27 de maio de 2013 às 06:37
The IT Solutions People disse...

I think it will be completely safe. Private key's are not something that a CA has or ever should have possession of so unless Google themselves provide their private key's willingly to government's all information remains private.

29 de maio de 2013 às 13:48
The IT Solutions People disse...

It is about time that Google moved to 2048 bit Roots and Keys. The continued use of the archaic Equifax Root signed hierarchy was a poor example to businesses and Enterprises on how to use SSL certificates to ensure the integrity of private and sensitive data and the legitimacy of the supposedly secured URL

SSL certificates are not used to protect Google themselves but the Public that interacts with Google, with the complete and unequivocal expectation that their Private and Sensitive data will remain just that.

Our core business principles are based on this message and this is the guidance that itsolutionspeople.com provide to its customers.

29 de maio de 2013 às 14:09
April Joy disse...

Is there a list of SSL compliant vendors out there?

19 de junho de 2013 às 15:12
Unknown disse...

To answer April Joy;
Symantec, GeoTrust, Thawte, Trustwave
http://goo.gl/RKaaVE

12 de agosto de 2013 às 17:03
pseudo nym disse...

Even with the expansion to 2048 bit keys, if the entropy generating the primes P and Q used for the encryption is too low, there are still issues. See the great research done by the University of Michigan about "minding your Ps and Qs" - one start point here - https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/nadiah/new-research-theres-no-need-panic-over-factorable-keys-just-mind-your-ps-and-qs/

So Google...do you have sufficient entropy? That's the real question. 1024 bit keys would theoretically have enough primes that there would never be an issue of duplicate keys, but poor random number generation and insufficient entropy led to the Michigan folks compromising about a half a percent of public keys. That is vastly more than predicted...

23 de agosto de 2013 às 13:10
Unknown disse...

When can we expect to see updated Google applications that support these recommendations?

At this time, Google Drive's PC application does not support SNI and performs some degree of certificate pinning for transfers.

30 de setembro de 2013 às 10:14
global protect disse...

Multi-domain SSL certificates refer to a specific type of SSL certificate that offer security to multiple domain and hostnames that exist within the same domain. Multi-domain certificates are occasionally referred to as unified communications certificate (UCC), multi-SAN or UC certificate. This certificate is perfect for Exchange Server 2010, Microsoft Live Communications Software, and Microsoft Exchange Server 2007.

21 de dezembro de 2013 às 13:29
Unknown disse...

We all know what's wrong and don't care, how do we get a new certificate from Google?

10 de maio de 2014 às 07:57

Postar um comentário

  

Marcadores


  • #sharethemicincyber
  • #supplychain #security #opensource
  • android
  • android security
  • android tr
  • app security
  • big data
  • biometrics
  • blackhat
  • C++
  • chrome
  • chrome enterprise
  • chrome security
  • connected devices
  • CTF
  • diversity
  • encryption
  • federated learning
  • fuzzing
  • Gboard
  • google play
  • google play protect
  • hacking
  • interoperability
  • iot security
  • kubernetes
  • linux kernel
  • memory safety
  • Open Source
  • pha family highlights
  • pixel
  • privacy
  • private compute core
  • Rowhammer
  • rust
  • Security
  • security rewards program
  • sigstore
  • spyware
  • supply chain
  • targeted spyware
  • tensor
  • Titan M2
  • VDP
  • vulnerabilities
  • workshop


Archive


  •     2025
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
    • jan.
  •     2024
    • dez.
    • nov.
    • out.
    • set.
    • ago.
    • jul.
    • jun.
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
    • jan.
  •     2023
    • dez.
    • nov.
    • out.
    • set.
    • ago.
    • jul.
    • jun.
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
    • jan.
  •     2022
    • dez.
    • nov.
    • out.
    • set.
    • ago.
    • jul.
    • jun.
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
    • jan.
  •     2021
    • dez.
    • nov.
    • out.
    • set.
    • ago.
    • jul.
    • jun.
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
    • jan.
  •     2020
    • dez.
    • nov.
    • out.
    • set.
    • ago.
    • jul.
    • jun.
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
    • jan.
  •     2019
    • dez.
    • nov.
    • out.
    • set.
    • ago.
    • jul.
    • jun.
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
    • jan.
  •     2018
    • dez.
    • nov.
    • out.
    • set.
    • ago.
    • jul.
    • jun.
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
    • jan.
  •     2017
    • dez.
    • nov.
    • out.
    • set.
    • jul.
    • jun.
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
    • jan.
  •     2016
    • dez.
    • nov.
    • out.
    • set.
    • ago.
    • jul.
    • jun.
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
    • jan.
  •     2015
    • dez.
    • nov.
    • out.
    • set.
    • ago.
    • jul.
    • jun.
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
    • jan.
  •     2014
    • dez.
    • nov.
    • out.
    • set.
    • ago.
    • jul.
    • jun.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
    • jan.
  •     2013
    • dez.
    • nov.
    • out.
    • ago.
    • jun.
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
    • jan.
  •     2012
    • dez.
    • set.
    • ago.
    • jun.
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
    • jan.
  •     2011
    • dez.
    • nov.
    • out.
    • set.
    • ago.
    • jul.
    • jun.
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
    • fev.
  •     2010
    • nov.
    • out.
    • set.
    • ago.
    • jul.
    • mai.
    • abr.
    • mar.
  •     2009
    • nov.
    • out.
    • ago.
    • jul.
    • jun.
    • mar.
  •     2008
    • dez.
    • nov.
    • out.
    • ago.
    • jul.
    • mai.
    • fev.
  •     2007
    • nov.
    • out.
    • set.
    • jul.
    • jun.
    • mai.

Feed

Follow
Give us feedback in our Product Forums.
  • Google
  • Privacy
  • Terms